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Politicians as Fiduciaries:
Public Law v. Private Law When
Altering the Date of an Election
Steven J. Cleveland*
Abstract
In the 2019 decision Rucho v. Common Cause, the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that federal challenges to partisan
gerrymandering—a practice yielding election results that
“reasonably seem unjust”—were non-justiciable. If partisan
gerrymandering claims are not federally justiciable, and if that
conclusion emboldens politicians, how else might incumbents
manipulate election mechanics to preserve their political
advantage? This Article explores one possibility that was briefly
mentioned by the Rucho majority: the strategic advancement or
delay of the date of a federal election. The strategic shift of
election day is not simply a theoretical problem. Foreign
politicians have strategically altered their election days for
partisan advantage, U.S. states have delayed elections to fill
vacant seats in the Senate, and members of the U.S. Congress
have repeatedly proposed changing the date of federal elections.
Because the U.S. Constitution empowers federal legislators
to establish the date of a federal election, just as the Rucho Court
emphasized that our charter empowers state legislators to
establish federal districts, a court may conclude that any
challenge to a shift in the date of an election is non-justiciable.
This Article addresses charter provisions not pertinent to
partisan gerrymandering that limit legislative discretion

*
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regarding a shift in the date of a federal election. Moreover, this
Article expands on a growing body of scholarship that recognizes
federal legislators as fiduciaries and that imports principles of
corporate law to analyze issues of federal election law. Given the
foundational importance of the shareholder franchise to
corporate law, courts closely scrutinize decisions by directors
that impede shareholders’ effective franchise, such as a shift in
the date that shareholders elect directors. Those corporate law
principles should inform a court’s analysis of any challenge to a
shift in the date of a federal election.
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I.

Introduction

In the 2019 decision Rucho v. Common Cause,1 the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously agreed that “[e]xcessive
partisanship in districting leads to [election] results that
reasonably seem unjust.” 2 Nonetheless, a majority of the Court
concluded that legal challenges to raw politics practiced by
incumbent state politicians, when “cracking” and “packing” that
portion of the electorate that favored the challenging party,
“present[ed] political questions beyond the reach of the federal
courts.”3 If partisan gerrymandering claims are not federally
justiciable,4 and if that conclusion emboldens politicians,5 how
else might incumbents manipulate election mechanics to
preserve their political advantage? This Article explores one
possibility that was briefly mentioned by the Rucho majority:

1. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
2. Id. at 2506; see id. at 2507 (“Our conclusion does not condone
excessive partisan gerrymandering.”); id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The
majority disputes none of what I have said (or will say) about how
gerrymanders undermine democracy. Indeed, the majority concedes (really,
how could it not?) that gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with democratic
principles.’” (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 791 (2015))); id. at 2515 (“[T]he majority declares that
it can do nothing about an acknowledged constitutional violation . . . .”).
3. Id. at 2506–07 (majority opinion).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[Partisan gerrymandering]
encourage[s] a politics of polarization and dysfunction. If left unchecked,
gerrymanders like the ones here may irreparably damage our system of
government.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t is unfortunate that our legislators have reached the point of
declaring that, when it comes to apportionment: ‘We are in the business of
rigging elections.’” (quoting John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away
from Easy Election, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1)); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court Just Abdicated its Most Important Role:
Enforcing the Constitution, L.A. TIMES (June 27, 2019, 10:19 AM), https://
perma.cc/2VZX-SHVL (“[K]nowing that courts can’t intervene, legislators who
benefit from partisan gerrymandering will only grow bolder. It is precisely in
situations like this, where the political process is unlikely to work, that judicial
enforcement of the Constitution is most important.”).
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the strategic advancement or delay of the date of a federal
election.6
The strategic shift of election day is not simply a theoretical
problem. Foreign politicians have strategically altered their
election days for partisan advantage,7 U.S. states have delayed
elections to fill vacant seats in the Senate,8 and members of
Congress have repeatedly proposed changing the date of federal
elections,9 purportedly for partisan advantage.10
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to establish the
date of a federal election.11 As emphasized by the Rucho
majority,12 the U.S. Constitution also empowers state legislators

6. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495 (“Antifederalists predicted that
Congress’s power under the Elections Clause would allow Congress to make
itself ‘omnipotent,’ setting the ‘time’ of elections as never . . . .”); see generally
Thomas Grove & Georgi Kantchev, Putin Moves to Shore Up Power, as Prime
Minister Resigns, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/LN2R-FYE6
(reporting changes intended by Putin that “would limit the power of a
potential successor after 2024, when he is required by law to step down”).
7. See Algerians Protest Bouteflika Decision to Delay Elections,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Dec. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/JM57-X3TH; Adrian
Blomfield, Congo Delays Election as Kabila Plots to Keep Power Whatever the
Result, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 20, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://perma.cc/2YAQ-4KLR;
Neil Munshi, Nigeria’s Election Delay Sparks Scramble for Digital Reboot, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/F6AT-ZRSN.
8. See Zachary D. Clopton & Steven E. Art, The Meaning of the
Seventeenth Amendment and a Century of State Defiance, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
1181, 1223 (2013) (arguing that “unreasonably delayed elections to fill
vacancies . . . violated the democratic spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment”).
9. See Louise Slaughter Weekend Voting Act, H.R. 5989, 115th Cong.
(2018) (proposing new dates for federal elections); S. 1828, 115th Cong. (2017)
(same); H.R. 1094, 115th Cong. (2017) (same); H.R. 3910, 114th Cong. (2015)
(same); H.R. 1641, 113th Cong. (2013) (same); H.R. 4183, 112th Cong. (2012)
(same); S. 149, 111th Cong. (2009) (same); H.R. 254, 111th Cong. (2009)
(same); S. 2638, 110th Cong. (2008) (same); H.R. 6240, 110th Cong. (2008)
(same); S. 144, 109th Cong. (2005) (same); S. 1320, 107th Cong. (2001) (same);
S. 1463, 105th Cong. (1997) (same).
10. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Note that a Democrat
proposed each of the bills cited in the preceding footnote. See Zachary B. Wolf,
Here’s Why Republicans Don’t Want an Election Day Holiday, CNN (Feb. 1,
2019, 11:57 AM), https://perma.cc/Q8PB-RAUC.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
12. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019) (concluding
that the Constitution permits state legislators to engage in partisan
gerrymandering).
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to establish federal political districts.13 So, any federal challenge
to a change in the date of a federal election could fail as
non-justiciable, consistent with Rucho.14 However, while one
provision of the U.S. Constitution does empower Congress to
establish the date of federal elections,15 other provisions impose
limits on that exercise of authority,16 which distinguishes
Rucho, where there were no limits regarding partisan
gerrymandering.17 Moreover, a growing body of scholarship
recognizes politicians as fiduciaries,18 and fiduciary duties may
further limit incumbents’ ability to manipulate the timing of a
federal election for partisan advantage.19 This Article expands
upon that growing body of scholarship and suggests that
constraints, not present in the gerrymandering context, may
cabin judicial discretion, rendering justiciable any federal
challenge to a congressional shift in the date of a federal
election. Finally, in Rucho, when concluding that the claims
were not federally justiciable, the majority emphasized the
availability of relief under state law.20 In contrast, states are left
powerless when Congress exercises its constitutional authority
to shift the date for federal elections, further distinguishing
Rucho.21
Recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s election-law
jurisprudence lacks coherence and that its analyses have
yielded
dissatisfying
results
regarding
legislative
entrenchment, scholars have advocated for the importation of

13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
14. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2496 (referencing factors to determine
whether a claim presents a non-justiciable political question).
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
16. See infra Part 0.
17. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (noting that the Court has never held
partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional).
18. See infra Part 0.
19. See infra Parts 0, 0, 0.
20. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08 (referencing how some states have
addressed partisan gerrymandering).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (empowering Congress to establish the date
of a federal election, preempting any date established under state law); id. art.
VI (“[T]he laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the
land . . . .”).
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analyses from other fields into the election law space. Noting
the similarities between corporate governance and political
governance, scholars have extended corporate law analyses into
election law. This Article extends that line of scholarship to
address the issue of legislators strategically shifting the date of
an election. Part II provides background on the regulations
applicable to corporate elections and federal elections. Part III
argues that federal politicians should be treated as fiduciaries,
just as corporate directors are fiduciaries, based upon historical
and functional analyses. Part IV addresses the fiduciary duties
to which corporate directors are subject, and how courts review
alleged breaches of those duties, before extending those
principles to federal legislators. Part V sets forth the judicial
analysis used when corporate directors strategically alter the
date of a shareholder meeting at which directors are elected, and
the limited situations in which courts apply that analysis, before
extending those principles to federal legislators. Part VI extends
that corporate law inquiry to the legislative setting.
II.

Regulations Regarding the Timing of Elections

Many election law scholars have shifted their focus from
general principles of constitutional law to non-constitutional
legal principles that may provide greater coherence.22 For
example, by acknowledging “politics as markets,” Samuel
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes applied antitrust law to
anticompetitive election laws generated by self-interested
legislators.23 The duo prompted others to apply economic
22. See David Schleicher, Overview: Mapping Election Law’s Interior, in
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 75, 76 (Guy-Uriel
E. Charles et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]he goal [of election-law scholarship] was . . . to
remove the study of the legal aspects of self-governance from general
constitutional law, because applying ordinary methods in constitutional
challenges to election rules caused the Supreme Court to develop deeply
inconsistent, theoretically unmoored election law jurisprudence.”); Richard H.
Pildes, The Supreme Court 2003 Term—Forward: The Constitutionalization of
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 40–41 (2004) (“[U]nderstandings of
individual rights, associational rights, and conceptions of equality must be
modified to develop an appropriate constitutional framework for the
increasingly important task of judicial oversight of democratic politics.”).
23. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 667 (1998).
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analyses to issues of election law. When analyzing partisan
gerrymandering by state legislators, D. Theodore Rave applied
general corporate law principles to those self-interested
legislators.24 Scholars have emphasized the similarities
between corporate governance and political governance,
notwithstanding their differences.25 This Part explores the
constitutional and statutory limits on corporate directors
altering the date of their election by shareholders before turning
to similar limits on federal legislators who might try to alter the
date of a federal election.
As a matter of corporate law, directors generally may,
consistent with governing regulations and corporate documents,
change the date of the election of directors.26 So too may federal
legislators, consistent with the text of U.S. Constitution and of
the U.S. Code, change the date of any federal election.27
Nonetheless, as will be developed in subsequent sections,
common law constrains the ability of corporate directors to
change the date of an election, given looming concerns of
self-interest and given the shareholders’ voting rights.28
Similarly, the common law should constrain federal legislators’
ability to change the date of a federal election, given looming
concerns of self-interest and given citizens’ voting rights.
A.

Corporate Elections

Neither the U.S. Constitution nor the U.S. Code speaks to
the timing of the election of corporate directors. Federalism
allows the states to serve as laboratories experimenting in
24. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV.
671, 707 (2013).
25. See id. at 719; Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress:
Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 845, 870 (2013); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins
of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 535 (2006). But see Ethan J. Leib et al.,
Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 94
(2013) (“[P]olitical relationships and corporate relationships are sufficiently
different that one should be wary of seamless application from one context to
the other.”).
26. See infra Part 0.
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
28. See infra Parts 0, 0.
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corporate law.29 A corporation is a legal entity organized under
the law of a particular state, and is subsequently regulated by
that state.30 While state law empowers shareholders to elect
directors,31 state constitutions and state corporate codes
generally do not prescribe a particular day for the election of
corporate directors.32 For example, while the Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL) contemplates an annual election of
corporate directors, it also empowers the directors to establish
the date of the election.33 (Because Delaware is the leading
provider of corporate law, this Article will emphasize its
corporate law.)34 Aside from public law, a corporation is
governed by its certificate of incorporation and bylaws.35 A
corporation’s directors must abide by that corporation’s

29. See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments . . . .”).
30. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
31. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (West 2020) (“Directors shall be
elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or
represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of
directors . . . .”).
32. See DEL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1–6 (addressing corporations, but not
addressing director elections).
33. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (“[A]n annual meeting of
stockholders shall be held for the election of directors on a date and at a time
designated by or in the manner provided in the bylaws.”); id. § 211(a)(1)
(“Meetings of stockholders may be held at such place, either within or without
this State as may be designated by or in the manner provided in the certificate
of incorporation or bylaws, or if not so designated, as determined by the board
of directors.”).
34. See Steven J. Cleveland, Process Innovation in the Production of
Corporate Law, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1829, 1832 n.10 (2008) (articulating
reasons for, and collecting sources regarding, Delaware’s dominance).
35. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (“[T]he certificate of
incorporation may also [set forth] . . . [a]ny provision for the management of
the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation . . . .”); id.
§ 109(b) (“The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or
with the certificate of incorporation, relating to . . . the rights or powers of its
stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”).
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certificate of incorporation and bylaws,36 but those documents
commonly empower the directors to establish the date on which
directors will be elected.37 With some regularity, directors will
establish the date of an election, and, after the occurrence of an
unexpected event, change the date on which shareholders will
elect directors.38
Some states require a corporation’s bylaws to set forth the
date for the election of directors.39 However, because a
corporation’s certificate of incorporation commonly empowers
the board of directors to amend the bylaws,40 the directors of
those corporations may change the date of the election by
amending the bylaws.41 As shareholders generally elect
directors annually, states commonly impose an outside
parameter by which an election should be convened; and if not
convened, judicial relief is available.42

36. See Morgan v. Thornhill, 78 U.S. 65, 72 (1870) (reporting the
initiation of judicial proceedings when the corporate directors could not comply
with the corporate charter); 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4197, at 803–04 (perm. ed., rev.
vol. 2010) (“The corporation, and its directors and officers, are bound by and
must comply with [the bylaws].”).
37. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Bylaws (Form S-1/A), at 1 (Feb. 8, 2012)
(“The annual meeting of stockholders shall be held on such date, time and
place, either within or without the State of Delaware, as may be designated
by resolution of the Board of Directors each year. At the meeting, directors
shall be elected . . . .”).
38. See infra Part 0.
39. See In re Tonopah United Water Co., 139 A. 762, 764 (Del. Ch. 1927)
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 1944 (1915)).
40. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2020) (“[A]ny corporation
may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or
repeal bylaws upon the directors . . . .”); see also Facebook, Inc., Eleventh
Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (Form S-1/A), at 21 (Feb.
8, 2012) (“[T]he Board of Directors of the Corporation is expressly authorized
to make, alter or repeal the Bylaws of the Corporation.”).
41. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)
(invalidating the directors’ amendment to the bylaws to change the date of the
election of directors, but not on statutory grounds).
42. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (West 2020) (“If there be a failure
to hold the annual meeting . . . for a period of 13 months after . . . its last
annual meeting . . . , the Court of Chancery may summarily order a meeting
to be held upon the application of any stockholder or director.”).
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Thus, either of the following scenarios may occur: (1) A
corporation’s bylaws empower directors to establish the date on
which shareholders will elect directors, and the directors, after
establishing one date for the election, establish a different date
for the election; or, (2) A corporation’s bylaws establish a date
on which shareholders will elect directors, and its board of
directors, exercising authority granted in the certificate of
incorporation, amend the bylaws to establish a different date for
the election. Therefore, directors typically may change the date
of the election consistent with statute and consistent with
governing corporate documents. So, directors may accelerate an
election or delay an election within statutory parameters
without giving rise to statutory relief. However, as fiduciaries,
directors must also comply with applicable common law.43 And,
common law fiduciary duties may constrain directors’ ability to
change the date on which shareholders elect directors.44
B.

Federal Elections

U.S. citizens elect U.S. Senators, U.S. Representatives, and,
indirectly, the U.S. President. 45 The U.S. Constitution does not
establish a specific date for federal elections.46 Instead, it
empowers each state to establish a date for federal elections, but
it also empowers Congress to preempt any such state decision

43. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del.
2006) (requiring compliance with statutory and common law); Gilbert v. El
Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1147 (Del. 1990) (same).
44. See infra Part 0.
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall
be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States . . . .”); id. amend. XVII, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for
six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.”); id. amend. XXIV, § 1
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or
other election for President or Vice President, for electors for
President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in
Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
46. See id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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via federal legislation.47 Congress exercised this power to
establish as federal election day the “Tuesday after the first
Monday in November, in every even numbered year.”48 To
change the date of federal elections, Congress need only amend
the U.S. Code in accordance with constitutional requirements.49
The Constitution, however, seemingly establishes explicit
and implicit parameters within which Congress may delay or
advance a federal election. As for delay, the Twentieth
Amendment provides that “Congress shall assemble . . . at noon
on the third day of January . . . .”50 By establishing a start date
in early January, the amendment suggests that the election,
because of which any new members of Congress will be seated,
has already occurred. Even if that suggestion is accurate, the
amendment continues: “The Congress shall assemble . . . at
noon on the third day of January, unless they shall by law
appoint a different day.”51 So, examining only the text, Congress
could delay a federal election beyond the third of January, and
also delay the beginning of its annual assemblage sometime
beyond that delayed election. Nonetheless, the Constitution
seemingly limits legislators’ ability to indefinitely delay an
election. The Constitution contemplates an election every other
year: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second year by the people of the several
states . . . .”52 By specifying an election “every second year,” it
seems that the Congress could not delay an election until the
“third” year, which contradicts the above-quoted language, and
47. See id. (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”); id. art.
II, § 1, cl. 4 (“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing [sic] the
Electors . . . .”).
48. 2 U.S.C. § 7 (addressing the election of members of the House); see id.
§ 1 (addressing the election of Senators); 3 U.S.C. § 1 (“The electors of
President and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday
next after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every
election of a President and Vice President.”).
49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
50. Id. amend. XX, § 2.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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which would extend the terms of representatives and some
senators beyond the terms specified in the Constitution.53
Accepting such constraints, federal legislators still wield
discretion to strategically time an election.54
Regarding the advancement of a federal election, the “every
second year” language of the Constitution also seemingly bars
the acceleration of an election by one year.55 In terms of an
implicit limit on the advancement of a federal election, one
should be aware that the Constitution once provided for a
lengthy lame duck period.56 Following ratification of the
Constitution, the then-existing “Congress designated March 4,
1789 as the official date when the Federal Government, as
outlined
in
the
Constitution,
would
begin
operation . . . . [L]egislative and executive offices . . . would
commence on March 4 and end in subsequent odd-numbered
years on the same date.”57 Moreover, the Constitution once
provided that Congress shall assemble annually in early
December.58 Consequently, a Congressman newly elected in an
even-numbered year, say November 1876,59 could not take office
53. See id. (specifying two-year term for representatives); id. art. I, § 3,
cl. 1 (specifying six-year term for senators).
54. See 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 53 (1968) (quoting James Iredell, Convention of North Carolina,
July 25, 1788)
If Congress can prolong the election to any time they please, why is
it said that representatives shall be chosen every second year? They
must be chosen every second year; but whether in the month of
March, or January, or any other month, may be ascertained, at a
future time, by regulations of Congress. The word time refers only
to the particular month and day within the two years.
55. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (specifying that an election should
occur “every second year”).
56. See STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON THE CONST. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 99TH CONG., AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 59–60 (1985) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS].
57. Id. at 59; see Act to Change the Times for Holding Circuit and District
Courts of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, ch. 11, § 3, 17
Stat. 23, 28 (1872) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 7).
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
59. See § 3, 17 Stat. at 28 (“That the Tuesday next after the first Monday
in November, in the year eighteen hundred and seventy-six, is hereby fixed
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in December 1876, because the incumbent Congressman’s term
did not expire until March 1877. Moreover, Congress did not sit
between March 1877 and December 1877, so the term of the
Congressman newly elected in November 1876 would not begin
until early December 1877, after more than one year had passed
from his election.60 Though not as lengthy, the presidential
lame-duck period once ran four months—early November to
early March.61 To shorten those lame-duck periods and for other
reasons, Congress proposed, and the states ratified, the
Twentieth Amendment.62 This background seemingly imposes
an implicit limit on Congress’s ability to accelerate a federal
election. To accelerate the date of a federal election to create a
fourteen-month lame-duck period for members of Congress
would seemingly contradict the intent of the Twentieth
Amendment.63 It is not, however, immediately apparent why
Congress could not accelerate the date of a federal election to
lengthen the lame-duck for a period shorter than one year.64
Perhaps members of Congress, like corporate directors,
should be treated as fiduciaries, and perhaps common law
should limit their ability to manipulate the election machinery
in self-interested ways.65

and established as the day, in each of the States and Territories of the United
States, for the election of Representatives and Delegates to the Forty-Fifth
Congress . . . .”).
60. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 56, at 59–60.
61. See Sam Barr, Shorten the Transition Period, HARV. POL. REV. (Nov.
16, 2008), https://perma.cc/5XUX-XUD6.
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
63. Perhaps creating a five-month lame-duck period would be
problematic, given the shortened lame-duck period for the president; however,
it is not immediately apparent why the presidential election must occur on the
same day as the election of members of Congress. See id. (providing different
end dates for their terms).
64. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
65. See Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Political Theory
and Legitimacy in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 163, 164 (Evan J. Criddle et al.
eds., 2018) (discussing fiduciary duties as a means of constraining political
actors); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 513, 573 (2015) (“[F]iduciary law provides sophisticated
mechanisms to address agency problems that arise in legislative settings.”).
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III. Fiduciaries
While corporate democracy and political democracy may
share some similarities,66 are there bases for courts to rely upon
common law fiduciary principles applicable to directors under
corporate law when resolving allegations against legislators?
Yes. First, leading political and legal thinkers have recognized
the historical connections between the governing principles of
corporations, states, and the United States. 67 Second, not every
relationship gives rise to fiduciary obligations, so, when
identifying those relationships that are fiduciary in nature,
courts and legal scholars have crafted criteria that apply
convincingly to federal politicians, as well as corporate
directors, who have long been recognized as fiduciaries of the
corporation and its shareholders.68
A.

Historical Connections

Justices of the Supreme Court, who were contemporaries of
the Founders, referred to the United States as a corporation.69
Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “The United States of America is
the true name of that grand corporation which the American
people have formed . . . .”70 Similarly, Founders recognized the
United States as a corporation. Alexander Hamilton wrote,
“[T]he institution of a government . . . [means] the creation of a
body politic, or corporation of the highest nature . . . .”71 James
Madison acknowledged that “[t]here was a gradation . . . from

66. See supra Part 0.
67. See infra Part 0.
68. See infra Part 0.
69. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 447 (1793) (“[N]ot only
each State singly, but even the United States may without impropriety be
termed ‘corporations.’”), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
70. Dixon v. United States, 7 F. Cas. 761, 763 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No.
3,934).
71. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank
of the United States, in THE FEDERALIST: COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898).
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the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to the
largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty.”72
As presented by William Blackstone, the towering English
legal commentator, . . . and by James Wilson, a leading
American legal commentator, leading participant in the
Constitutional Convention, and future Supreme Court
justice, a corporation is: A body politic created by the
sovereign, exercising governmental authority delegated in
special fashion by the sovereign, limited by the law of the
sovereign, and structured by the sovereign. It is not so hard
to imagine that the corporation . . . might become a model for
a liberal constitutional republic.73

Modern legal thinkers have also recognized the historical
connection between corporations and the United States. Akhil
Amar wrote of “U.S.A., Inc.,” 74 analogizing government officials
to corporate officials, in light of the fact that “the corporate
analogy seeped deep into the thought patterns of the men who
would eventually label themselves Federalists in 1787.”75
According to David Ciepley, “all American governments
qualified as literal corporations . . . .”76 And, writing specifically
about the states, Ciepley emphasized that the “earliest
American colonies, pioneers in the use of written constitutions,
were pioneers because they were corporations—the Virginia
Company, the Massachusetts Bay Company . . . [which] could,

72. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 463–64
(Farrand, ed., 1911); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (ABA
Classics ed., 2009) (discussing the power of the “constitutional charter”).
73. David Ciepley, Is the U.S. Government a Corporation? The Corporate
Origins of Modern Constitutionalism, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418, 420–21
(2017); see TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 113 (2011) (“[F]iduciaries hold
positions of power, such as . . . government offices . . . .”); id. at 279–87
(discussing government officials as fiduciaries).
74. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1517 (1987).
75. Id. at 1434; see Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public
Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1084–86 (2004) (reporting that both proponents
and opponents of the U.S. Constitution used fiduciary language—“public
trust,” “trustees,” “entrusted,” and “agent”).
76. Ciepley, supra note 73, at 433.
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without changing a word, repurpose [its] company charter as a
colonial constitution.”77
Moreover, legal scholars have referenced the corporate
analogy when addressing obligations of legislators in the voting
context.78 This Article builds upon the foundational
legislator-as-fiduciary work of Evan J. Criddle, Evan
Fox-Decent, Tamar Frankel, Andrew S. Gold, Sung Hui Kim,
Ethan J. Leib, Paul B. Miller, Robert G. Natelson, and David L.
Ponet,79 while acknowledging the limitations that they specify
in their own work, as well as criticisms identified by Seth Davis,
Heather K. Gerken, and Michael S. Kang.80
B.

Characteristics of Fiduciaries

Courts have long identified certain relationships as
fiduciary in nature: trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, and
attorney-client.81 Courts, however, have been “extremely vague
77. Id. at 423–24.
78. See Rave, supra note 24, at 676–77; Kim, supra note 25, at 871 tbl.1.
79. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 286 (“The different views concerning
the fiduciary laws, both private and governmental, relate to where the lines
should be drawn rather than to the principles to be followed.”); Evan J. Criddle
& Evan Fox-Decent, Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual Commission of
Public Fiduciaries, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 67, 83 (2018) (“[A]ll public
institutions—including the various organs of the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches—stand in fiduciary relationships to the people over whom
they assert jurisdiction . . . .”); Kim, supra note 25, at 870 (discussing
“Legislators as Fiduciaries”); Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 565 (“The idea
that the state and its officials occupy a fiduciary role is longstanding . . . .”);
Natelson, supra note 75, at 1095–136 (detailing the legal and philosophical
influences of the Founders, including Plato and Blackstone, that contemplated
fiduciary government); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s
Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (2011)
(“[T]hinking of public officials as fiduciaries is not only an historical
inheritance but is also indicated by functional and structural considerations
of the relationship between the ruler and ruled.”).
80. See infra Part 0 (addressing criticisms set forth in Seth Davis, The
False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 N.D. L. REV. 1145 (2014); Heather
K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, Deja Vu All Over Again: Courts, Corporate Law,
and Election Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 86 (2013)).
81. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 220–21 (2003)
(referring to attorneys as fiduciaries of clients); Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath
Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 11 (2001) (referring to trustees as
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in articulating the standards”82 to determine whether a
relationship is fiduciary in nature.83 Scholars have surveyed
cases to identify those standards. Though, in certain respects,
each scholar’s theory differs, they have identified some common
ground.84

fiduciaries of beneficiaries); Yerger v. Jones, 57 U.S. 30, 33 (1854) (referring
to guardians as fiduciaries of wards); see also D. Gordon Smith, The Critical
Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1412–13 (2002)
(referring to relations identified as fiduciary in nature for centuries).
82. Smith, supra note 81, at 1412.
83. See id. at 1448–49 (“Fiduciary and nonfiduciary relationships do not
occupy wholly separate realms, but instead lie on a continuum. Passage from
one side of the continuum to the other is seamless; nevertheless, courts are
tasked with locating a seam.”).
84. See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS
FIDUCIARY 93–94 (2011)
The fundamental conditions which give rise to a fiduciary
relationship are the following: (i) the fiduciary has administrative
control over the beneficiary or certain of her interests; (ii) the
beneficiary is incapable of controlling the fiduciary’s exercise of
power, or is incapable in principle of exercising the kind of power
held by the fiduciary; and (iii) the relevant interests of the
beneficiary are capable of forming the subject matter of a fiduciary
obligation.
See also Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 549 (“A fiduciary relationship is one
in which one person (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power to pursue an
abstract other-regarding purpose or the significant practical interests of
another person (an individual beneficiary or ascertained set of
beneficiaries).”); Ponet & Leib, supra note 79, at 1255
In the fiduciary relationship, the beneficiary is dependent on the
fiduciary to act after her interests and the fiduciary is, accordingly,
obligated to use her entrusted discretionary power in pursuit of the
beneficiary’s interests. Because they are difficult to monitor, and
have wide access to power over beneficiary resources and assets,
fiduciaries are under rigorous obligations that ensure compliance
with their role responsibilities. (footnotes omitted)
Smith, supra note 81, at 1402 (“[F]iduciary relationships form when one party
(the ‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while
exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the
beneficiary.”); cf. Kim, supra note 25, at 867–68 (“Instead of deploying a widely
accepted, precise, and rule-like definition . . . courts . . . invoke an ad hoc list
of vague factors” to identify fiduciaries, including an “imbalance in the
relationship,” “dominance,” or “granting of some form of discretionary
authority and a resulting dependency.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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Tamar Frankel proposes that all fiduciaries share the
following characteristics:
First, fiduciaries offer mainly services (in contrast to
products). The services that fiduciaries offer are usually
socially desirable, and often require expertise . . . . Second,
in order to perform these services effectively, fiduciaries
must be entrusted with property or power. Third,
entrustment poses to entrustors the risks that the fiduciaries
will not be trustworthy. They may . . . misuse the entrusted
power . . . . Fourth, there is likelihood that (1) the entrustor
will fail to protect itself from the risks involved in fiduciary
relationships; (2) the markets may fail to protect entrustors
from these risks; and that (3) the costs for the fiduciaries of
establishing their trustworthiness may be higher than their
benefits from the relationships.85

Evan Fox-Decent, Andrew S. Gold, Ethan J. Leib, Paul B.
Miller, David L. Ponet, and D. Gordon Smith largely agree with
the characteristics identified by Frankel.86 Corporate
directors—long recognized as fiduciaries of the corporation and
shareholders—reflect those characteristics, as do federal
legislators.87
1.

Service

Fiduciaries typically provide socially-desirable services, not
products, that commonly require expertise.88 For example, the
law has long recognized as fiduciaries doctors and lawyers, who
provide socially-desirable services that require expertise.89
While plumbers provide socially-desirable services that require
expertise, the law generally does not recognize plumbers as
fiduciaries because they do not adequately meet other criteria
outlined in this section.90 For example, the degree of trust is
85. FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 6 (citations omitted).
86. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
87. FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 22–23, 113 (“[F]iduciaries hold positions
of power, such as . . . government offices . . . .”); id. at 279–87 (discussing
government officials as fiduciaries).
88. See id. at 6.
89. See id. at 42–43.
90. See id. at 7.
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likely lower with respect to a plumber than a doctor—yes, you
trust a plumber to unclog the drain, but you place much more
trust in a doctor to unclog your artery.91 Moreover, the entrustor
is better able to monitor a plumber (“Is my sink unclogged or
not?”) relative to monitoring a doctor (“Is my artery unclogged
or not?”).92
a.

Directors

Corporate
directors
provide
services
that
are
socially-desirable and require expertise. As a general matter,
every state views corporations as socially beneficial: Every state
provides for their creation, views directors as providing socially
beneficial services, and contemplates that directors will manage
those corporations.93 Directors possess pertinent expertise that
contributes to their election or appointment. 94 Corporate
directors have long been recognized as fiduciaries.95
b.

Legislators

Legislators provide services that are socially-desirable and
require expertise. “Public offices are . . . delegations of portions
of the sovereign power for the welfare of the public . . . .”96

91. See id. at 12.
92. See infra Part 0.
93. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102, 141 (West 2020).
94. See Steve Wolosky et al., Top 5 Things Shareholder Activists Need to
Know, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/9YVKQARW (“An activist’s likelihood of success in an election contest is inextricably
tied to the qualifications and expertise of the activist’s director slate.”); see also
Robin Ferracone, Good Governance: Do Boards Need Cyber Security Experts?,
FORBES (July 9, 2019, 12:42 PM), https://perma.cc/TMU7-TZAY (“It is
increasingly accepted that it is important to have a cybersecurity/technology
expert on a given company’s board to ensure the board is aware of potential
business risks.”).
95. FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 42, 50 (noting that “traditional fiduciaries”
include corporate directors).
96. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 1 (2020); see id. § 3
(“A public office is created in the interest and for the benefit of the
people . . . .”); FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 23 (“[A]n entrustment of the power
of office . . . must be used for the benefit of the population . . . .”).
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Members of Congress do not produce products per se;97 they
serve their constituents.98 Members of Congress serve their
constituents by enacting legislation,99 monitoring the executive
branch,100
and convening hearings and conducting
investigations
regarding
public101
and
private
102
parties —perhaps as a prelude to congressional action.
Members of the House serve their districts, their states, and the
United States;103 senators serve their states and the United
States.104 While certain fiduciaries, like doctors and lawyers,
must pass written exams to demonstrate their expertise,105 the
U.S. Constitution imposes minimal qualifications for service as
a senator or representative.106 Nonetheless, those who campaign

97. However, some do consider legislation to be a product. See Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 280–81 (1985).
98. See generally R.J. DUKE SHORT, THE CENTENNIAL SENATOR 31 (2006)
(“Senator Thurmond’s constituent service was legendary. . . . [He] called it
‘doing the people’s work’.”).
99. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7–8.
100. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 865, 889 (2007).
101. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, The Investigations That Led to Scott Pruitt’s
Resignation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/W9WK-YHQ5.
102. See, e.g., Mark Zuckerberg Testimony: Senators Question Facebook’s
Commitment to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/EZY3D6LU.
103. See Kim, supra note 25, at 870–71 (“Consider the following potential
beneficiaries [of legislators]: citizens, the legislature (and fellow legislators),
and the government that the legislator serves.”).
104. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 62, 63 (James Madison).
105. See Emma Goldberg, Bar and Medical Exam Delays Keep Graduates
in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/T7BY-8VEV (reporting
that COVID-19 prevented the administration of professionally required
exams).
106. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative
who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No
Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty
Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”).
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for federal office tout their qualifications, as well as their areas
of pertinent expertise.107
2.

Entrustment Regarding Power or Property

To perform the services mentioned above, a fiduciary must
be entrusted with discretion regarding power or property.108
Absent such entrustment, the entrusting party does not derive
the benefit of the relationship.109 For example, a principal
entrusts an agent—a long-recognized fiduciary—with the power
to legally bind the principal.110 Patients entrust their
health—power over their well-being—to their fiduciary
doctors.111 Clients may entrust their liberty—power over their
well-being—to their fiduciary lawyers.112 A trustor entrusts
property to a trustee.113
107. See generally Meet Elizabeth, WARREN FOR PRESIDENT, https://
perma.cc/W3EK-QLLU (touting her expertise in bankruptcy and consumer
finance as qualifications to benefit the middle class and to provide a check on
corporate power).
108. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 6 (“[F]iduciaries must be entrusted
with property or power.”); FOX-DECENT, supra note 84, at 93–94 (referencing
the necessary condition of “administrative power over the beneficiary or
certain of her interests”); Ponet & Leib, supra note 79, at 1255 (referencing
“entrusted discretionary power in pursuit of the beneficiary’s interests” and
“wide access to power over beneficiary resources and assets”); Smith, supra
note 81, at 1443 (“[A] critical resource . . . is the basis for imposition of
fiduciary duties . . . .”).
109. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 8 (“Entrustors entrust property of
power to fiduciaries . . . for the purpose of benefiting the entrustors . . . .”).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006)
(“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall
act on the principal’s behalf . . . and the agent manifests assent or otherwise
consents so to act.”).
111. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 43 (addressing the doctor-patient
relationship).
112. See, e.g., La. State Bar Ass’n v. Amberg, 553 So. 2d 448, 450 (La. 1989)
(listing the “cherished right[s]” clients entrust to their lawyers: life, liberty,
and property).
113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. L. INST. 2003)
A trust . . . is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property,
arising from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship
and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties
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a.

Directors

As a legal-fiction entity, a corporation cannot manage itself,
so the law entrusts its management to a board of directors,114
each of whom must be a natural person.115 As corporations
increase in size, they typically exhibit a separation of ownership
and control—with shareholders “owning” the corporation, and
directors and officers “controlling” the corporation.116 Corporate
shareholders, who elect directors,117 place their trust in
directors to manage the corporation for their benefit.118
b.

Legislators

The
Constitution
contemplates
a
representative
government,119 not direct democracy of the sort practiced in New
England town hall meetings.120 Thus, the electorate does not
govern itself; instead, the populace elects others to govern on
their behalf. The Constitution grants tremendous discretion to

to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons,
at least one of whom is not the sole trustee.
114. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2020) (“The business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”).
115. See, e.g., id. § 141(b) (“The board of directors of a corporation shall
consist of 1 or more members, each of whom shall be a natural person.”).
116. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6–7 (1933). Rather than “owners,”
shareholders might more accurately be described as “residual claimants.”
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 67–68 (1991).
117. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3).
118. See Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 206 (Del. 2008) (noting that
directors owe duties to the corporation and its shareholders); In re Trados Inc.
S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (reporting that
director-fiduciaries must “maximize the value of the corporation over the
long-term” for the benefit of shareholders).
119. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (ABA Classics ed.,
2009).
120. Cf. Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Ind. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787,
793–94 (2015) (highlighting the novelty of “direct lawmaking by the people” in
1787); FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 23 (highlighting the “entrustment of the
power of office”).
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members of Congress over the electorate.121 The Constitution
empowers members of Congress to impact the electorate by
taxing them,122 enacting laws that could result in their
incarceration,123 and subjecting them to war and military
service.124 “[A] public office is considered a public trust.” 125
3.

Risk of Untrustworthiness or Abuse of Power

Having been entrusted with power or property, the
fiduciary possesses discretion to perform the service or oversee
the entrusted property, and that discretion may be abused.126
Untrustworthiness arises because the entrusting party cannot
foresee, and contract for, all eventualities.127 Of course, any
contractual relationship gives rise to issues of trust, which could
be exploited, but not every contractual relationship gives rise to
a fiduciary relationship.128 Courts and commentators seek,
perhaps as mentioned above, the entrustment of more
significant powers or larger amounts of property.129 And, as
mentioned below, a fiduciary relationship arises where the
exercise of discretion by the entrusted party cannot be easily
and effectively monitored by the entrusting party.130 For
example, a lawyer-fiduciary may draft a flawed will, which flaws
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (establishing Congress’s legislative powers).
122. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
123. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 10, 18.
124. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16.
125. State ex rel. Bonner v. Dist. Ct., 206 P.2d 166, 169 (Mont. 1949).
126. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 6 (discussing the risk of untrustworthy
fiduciaries); FOX-DECENT, supra note 84, at 93 (“[T]he beneficiary is incapable
of controlling the fiduciary’s exercise of power . . . .”); Kim, supra note 25, at
867–68 (citing courts’ references to “discretionary authority,” “imbalance in
the relationship,” and “dominance”).
127. Smith, supra note 81, at 1448 (“[C]ontracts . . . specifying obligations
of the fiduciary are necessarily incomplete . . . .”).
128. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 12 (“[T]he necessary degree of trust in
fiduciary relationship[s] must be quite high.”); Smith, supra note 81, at
1438– 39 (distinguishing fiduciary relationships from other contractual
relationships).
129. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 26 (“Depending on the nature of the
services, greater specifications, constraints, or control over the fiduciaries’
performance would undermine the very utility of the relationship.”).
130. See infra Part III.B.4.
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POLITICIANS AS FIDUCIARIES

may not be identified ex ante by the non-lawyer testator or
non-lawyer beneficiaries, and which flaws may be identified
only after the testator’s death.
a.

Directors

In managing a corporation, directors enjoy tremendous
discretion. Under the business judgment rule, when
shareholders challenge decisions by the board of directors,
courts defer to those decisions, except in limited
circumstances.131 Such discretion may enable untrustworthy
decisions or may result in an abuse of power.132 Contracts
cannot effectively bind directors: How could the parties know,
on day one, how a director should vote on a proposed merger or
charter amendment that may not arise until day 200, except in
131. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 n.37 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting
that plaintiff-shareholders must overcome the presumptions of the business
judgment rule, such as the presumptions that directors were informed and
acted in good faith to further the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, not to further their self-interest).
132. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280
(Del. 1989)
The board was torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly
independent auction, free of [one bidder’s] interference and access
to confidential data. By placing the entire process in the hands of
[the chief executive officer, who was also a bidder in the auction],
through his own chosen financial advisors, with little or no board
oversight, the board materially contributed to the unprincipled
conduct of those upon whom it looked with a blind eye.
Steven J. Cleveland, A Failure of Substance and a Failure of Process: The
Circular Odyssey of Oklahoma’s Corporate Law Amendments in 2010, 2012,
and 2013, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 221, 227–28 (2015)
[A]s its stock price plummeted in 2008, Chesapeake’s board agreed
to purchase from its CEO a number of antique maps for $12 million.
The board’s generosity seemed tied to the personal needs of its CEO,
not to the company’s performance. To cover a margin call,
McClendon involuntarily sold 30,000,000 shares of Chesapeake—or
approximately 94% of the shares he owned—over the course of three
days in October 2008. Following those sales, the board responded,
but not as the market might have expected; the board amended
McClendon’s employment agreement to reduce his required
investment in Chesapeake, which weakened the link between his
personal interests and the interests of Chesapeake’s shareholders.
(footnotes omitted).
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abstract terms—e.g., maximize shareholder value—which
terms do not lend themselves to enforceable contracts, but do
lend themselves to contextual fiduciary duties?
b.

Legislators

Sadly, federal politicians, all too frequently, have proven
untrustworthy and have abused their power. Sometimes, such
incidents so captured our attention that they become known by
short-hand: McCarthyism,133 Watergate,134 and the Teapot
Dome Scandal.135 Senators and representatives have used their
positions for sexual benefit,136 conversions of contributions for
personal use,137 and insider trading.138 Politicians may make
unenforceable pledges, but contracts cannot effectively
discipline politicians.139 As a preliminary matter, with whom
133. See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE
WORLD OF JOE MCCARTHY (1983).
134. See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE
PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974).
135. See generally LATON MCCARTNEY, THE TEAPOT DOME SCANDAL: HOW
BIG OIL BOUGHT THE HARDING WHITE HOUSE AND TRIED TO STEAL THE COUNTRY
(2008).
136. See Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Rep. Raul Grijalva Under Scrutiny by
House Ethics Committee over Workplace Allegations, ARIZ. CENT. (JUNE 14,
2019, 4:42 PM), https://perma.cc/8733-LLYR (reporting allegations that
member was repeatedly drunk and created hostile work environment); 90
State Lawmakers Accused of Sexual Misconduct Since 2017, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/H2PT-2GJS (reporting instances of lawmaker
sexual misconduct, including abusing staffers and constituents);
Congressional Misconduct Database, GOVTRACK, https://perma.cc/VU4VGFMT (reporting allegations of sexual misconduct).
137. See Congressional Misconduct Database, supra note 136 (reporting
misuse of campaign funds, and bribery).
138. See Kim, supra note 25, at 846–47 (referencing Representative
Spencer Bachus’s alleged insider trading during the 2008 financial crisis).
139. Compare Ari Shapiro, The Man Behind the GOP’s No-Tax Pledge,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 14, 2011, 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/42WG-NB6A
(quoting Grover Norquist) (“Take the pledge, win the primary. Take the
pledge, win the general. Break the pledge, lose.”), with U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3
(requiring members of Congress to take oath to support the Constitution), id.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress to impose taxes), and John Dean, Why
Grover Norquist’s Anti-Tax Pledge is Unenforceable and Unconstitutional,
VERDICT (Nov. 30, 2012), https://perma.cc/S5ZA-KNRV (“There is no
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would a politician enter an enforceable contract? And, as was
the case with corporate directors, the parties to the contract
would be unable to foresee issues that would arise or how those
future issues should be resolved ex ante, except in abstract
terms that do not lend themselves to enforceable contracts, e.g.,
“When faced with a tax bill, the politician shall vote to further
the public interest.”140
4.

Monitoring Costs, Bonding Costs, and Market Discipline

Courts are less inclined to recognize fiduciary relationships
where monitoring costs or bonding costs are low or where the
market adequately disciplines the supposed fiduciary. As a
simple analogy to introduce these concepts, consider the
parent-babysitter relationship. A parent, who goes to the movies
for date night, and who entrusts a child to a babysitter, bears
monitoring costs by, for example, purchasing a nanny-cam to
ensure that the babysitter is performing the job as desired. A
babysitter bears bonding costs to align his interests with the
parent’s interests. For example, a babysitter may regularly
charge a standard rate, say $10.00 per hour, but, to bond his
interests to those of the parent, the babysitter agrees to a lower
hourly rate if (i) the child fails to eat a serving of spinach at
dinner, (ii) the child fails to complete assigned homework, or (iii)
the child fails to brush her teeth before bedtime. Chatter among
parents in the neighborhood—an information market—may also
discipline babysitters who seek additional work. The
availability
of
other
local
babysitters—a
labor
market—similarly
incents
compliance
with
parents’
preferences.

consideration, as would be required for the Norquist pledge to be binding.
Rather, the pledge is merely a written campaign promise.”).
140. See Dean, supra note 139 (noting that compliance with the oath to
uphold the Constitution requires an exercise of discretion, not compliance with
pre-election pledge); Alex Altman, The Perils of Political Pledges, TIME (July
1, 2011), https://perma.cc/VK4F-WFUC (exploring the limits of political
pledges).
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a.

Monitoring Costs

Courts and commentators recognize fiduciary relationships
where the entrusting party cannot effectively monitor the
entrusted party.141 The following must be relatively cost
effective: (1) the accumulation of relevant information, (2) the
review and comprehension of that information, and (3) the
ability to act on that information in ways that discipline the
straying fiduciary.142 For example, in the doctor-patient
fiduciary relationship, the patient may relatively cheaply gather
information—consultations pre-treatment and acquisition of
medical charts post-treatment. However, the expertise of the
doctor fiduciary renders monitoring difficult for patients who
lack that expertise.143 Relatedly, simply examining the results
of the treatment provides a poor proxy for the doctor’s
performance of her duties. Was the patient’s death or worsening
condition due to the doctor’s failure or the patient’s poor
condition at the time that treatment was sought?
(1) Directors
Monitoring costs commonly inhibit shareholders from
disciplining corporate directors. Federal and state law require
directors to disclose information to keep shareholders informed
generally and in connection with matters subject to a vote by
shareholders.144 However, directors are not obligated to provide
information to shareholders simply because that information is

141. See Ponet & Leib, supra note 79, at 1255 (stating that fiduciaries are
“difficult to monitor”); Smith, supra note 81, at 1443 (“Where self-help
protection of the critical resource is strong, the case for judicial protection
through the imposition of loyalty obligations is weak . . . .”).
142. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 9–10, 46, 91–92.
143. The beneficiary’s possession of expertise does not foil a fiduciary
relationship. For example, attorneys are advised not to represent themselves,
so an attorney-client benefits from a fiduciary relationship with the retained
attorney-fiduciary.
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (requiring that publicly-traded corporations file
publicly-available, periodic reports); id. § 78n (requiring that publicly-traded
corporations provide shareholders with information regarding upcoming
votes); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2020) (requiring that corporations
provide information to shareholders regarding votes on mergers).
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desired or would be useful. 145 The significant amount of
information disclosed may never be read or may not be
understood by many shareholders.146 Notwithstanding
significant disclosure, investors may not comprehend the
information available.147
Third parties may also be retained to provide monitoring
services. For example, directors may subject their performance
to verification by independent auditors.148 Independent auditors
review the corporation’s financial statements to verify that
those statements conform to generally accepted accounting
principles.149 Nonetheless, such third-party monitoring may
prove ineffective.150 The financial statements of Enron and
WorldCom were audited by independent third parties, which did
not prevent those companies from engaging in accounting
shenanigans.151 While third party-verifiers as a whole have
strong incentives to protect their reputations,152 individuals at

145. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (“Silence,
absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading . . . .”); Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores,
Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 2000) (acknowledging that “[p]rojections, more
current financials and information about prices discussed with other possible
acquirors” may be helpful, but information need not be disclosed “simply
because [it] might be helpful”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Rethinking the Board
of Directors: Getting Outside the Box, 74 BUS. LAW. 285, 294 (2019) (“Once
directors are on the board, they are largely insulated from market forces,
because votes are private and decisions are made collectively.”).
146. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 297 (noting that
unsophisticated investors are uninformed).
147. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 270–74
(2014) (discussing criticisms of the efficient capital markets hypothesis); id. at
289–91 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same).
148. See Financial Reporting Manual, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 2,
2019), https://perma.cc/73TU-QKVE (noting that for certain companies,
“[f]inancial statements . . . must be reviewed by an independent accountant
before filing”).
149. See id.
150. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698–702
(2005) (discussing third-party monitoring gone awry).
151. See id. at 698–702 (2005) (detailing Enron’s dubious accounting
practices); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 397–98
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (detailing WorldCom’s dubious accounting practices).
152. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 282.
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those firms may face incentive structures that lead them to
provide false certifications.153
The securities markets provide a means of disciplining
directors, but less so if information is not disclosed or is
misunderstood and as impediments to acquisitions and activism
increase.154 Shareholders vote, but infrequently,155 lessening the
effect of one avenue of discipline on straying directors.156
Despite the shareholders’ collective power to elect and remove
directors,157 directors rarely face competitive elections, and are
rarely removed from office in the middle of their terms.158
Collective action problems counsel against meaningful
participation in the electoral process by holders of a small
number of shares.159 Holders of a large number of shares may
abide by the “Wall Street Rule,” selling their shares rather than
trying to halt an unwise decision or generally trying to improve
the governance of a particular corporation.160 In the end,
directors may not be disciplined except in extremis. 161

153. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A
Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 184
(2000).
154. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 56–57 (Del.
Ch. 2011) (expressing doubt that an inadequate offer constitutes a threat
against which directors should be able to defend but adhering to binding
precedent and upholding the continued maintenance of a poison pill).
155. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 66 (“Because voting
is expensive, the participants in the venture will arrange to conserve on its
use.”).
156. See id.
157. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(k), 216 (West 2020).
158. See STEVEN J. CLEVELAND, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: A MULTIMEDIA APPROACH loc. 11493 (3d ed. 2018) (ebook)
(discussing the infrequency of “proxy contests”); Bainbridge, supra note 145,
at 294 (“Today, there is no true market in which prospective directors compete
for positions.” (footnote omitted)); Kelli Alces Williams, Externalizing Board
Governance Means Changing the Board’s Function, 74 BUS. LAW. 297, 298
(2019) (discussing CEOs calling on friends and acquaintances to fill director
vacancies).
159. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 71.
160. George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1287, 1288–89.
161. See Bainbridge, supra note 145, at 286 (“[T]oday there is a general
consensus that boards, as currently structured, fail all too frequently.”).
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(2) Legislators
Voters may not be able to effectively discipline politicians
due to monitoring costs and the voters’ relative inability to act
on available information. C-SPAN, Congress.gov, and other
sources provide an abundance of information regarding
members of Congress and congressional (in)action.162 However,
C-SPAN is not a ratings killer,163 and, while Congress.gov had
over one million page views one day in January 2017,164 consider
that ESPN.com—a website dedicated to sports—had over ten
million page views per day throughout August 2019.165 Instead
of relying upon firehose sources of information, like C-SPAN or
Congress.gov, voters may turn to third parties—e.g., the New
York Times or Fox News—to distill an avalanche of information
into digestible morsels.166 Still, valuable information—e.g., a
Congress member’s ability to effectively negotiate behind the
scenes—may not be available to the voting public.167
Scholars commonly claim that voters are rationally
ignorant.168 This theory speaks to voters’ incentives to

162. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (requiring that each house of
Congress maintain a publicly-available journal that details proceedings and
votes).
163. Cf. Nicole Hemmer, An Ode to C-SPAN in an Era Dominated by Cable
TV like Fox News, NBC (Mar. 27, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://perma.cc/LFS2UEQF (“[T]here are no ratings figures for C-SPAN to determine if it attracts
more eyeballs than, say, MSNBC. (We can assume it does not.)”).
164. Reaching a Web Traffic Milestone on Congress.gov, LIBR. OF CONG.
(Apr. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/99CC-UKSW.
165. See ESPN.com Continues to Reign Among Sports Sites; Site Continues
to Show Year-Over-Year Growth, ESPN (Sept. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc
/AY9C-VXR5.
166. See Hemmer, supra note 163 (“These days the American political
scene is much more a product of Fox News and CNN than C-SPAN . . . .”).
167. See Sarah A. Binder & Frances E. Lee, Making Deals in Congress, in
POLITICAL NEGOTIATION: A HANDBOOK 64 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo
Martin eds., 2016) (noting that members of Congress conduct
“negotiations . . . behind closed doors”).
168. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Decentralization, and Development,
102 MINN. L. REV. 1649, 1657 (2018) (discussing voters’ incentives to be
“rationally ignorant”).
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accumulate and comprehend information,169 as well as a voter’s
limited ability to discipline any politician that deviates from a
voter’s preferred course of action.170 Voters cannot remove any
federal politician from office during the middle of her term; the
powers of impeachment and removal are reserved to the House
and the Senate through independent processes. 171 This
structure lessens accountability to voters. Moreover, federal
politicians serve multi-year terms, so there are infrequent
opportunities for voters to oust underperforming officials from
office.172 Without an effective challenger, political incumbents
face less accountability. Federal elections are generally
contested, but competitive campaigns can be extraordinarily
expensive.173 Incumbents enjoy numerous advantages over
challengers, including a fundraising advantage.174 A majority of
incumbent legislators routinely retain their seats.175 Of course,
169. See id. (“In addition to acquiring very little information, voters have
little incentive to analyze what they do learn in a logical, unbiased way.”).
170. See id. at 1658 (recognizing the dearth of “clout tha[t] an average
ballot-box voter [has] in an election”).
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; see Ciepley, supra note
73, at 432 (noting that Antifederalists failed in their quest to empower the
populace to recall federal politicians in the middle of their terms).
172. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (setting senators’ terms of office at six
years); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (setting representatives’ terms of office at two years);
id. art II, § 1, cl. 1 (setting the President’s term of office at four years).
173. See Statistical Summary of 18-Month Campaign Activity of the
2017– 2018 Election Cycle, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Aug. 30, 2018), https://
perma.cc/92SX-AMSD (“Congressional candidates running in 2017 and 2018
collected $1.7 billion and disbursed $1.1 billion, political parties received
$924.3 million and spent $690.9 million, and political action committees
(PACs) raised $2.6 billion and spent $2.2 billion during the first 18 months of
the 2017-2018 election cycle . . . .”).
174. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to
Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2411 (2006) (reviewing
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE L IBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005)) (stating that campaign finance laws “mak[e] it more
difficult for challengers to raise sufficient funds to overcome the advantages of
incumbency”).
175. See Paul Bedard, 2020 Swamp: 79 Percent of House Seats Already
Rated “Safe”, WASH. EXAM’R (Jan. 17, 2019, 2:42 PM), https://perma.cc/Y9NL6SEX (“The first analysis of the upcoming 2020 congressional election shows
that already nearly 8 in 10 members are in ‘safe’ districts . . . .”); Stuart
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a single voter is unlikely to impact the outcome of a public
election.176 Collective action problems contribute to federal
politicians’ lack of accountability.177 The high cost of educating
oneself about competing candidates and their positions, and the
low likelihood of one’s vote altering the outcome of the election
lead to rational ignorance and rational apathy.178 While there
exists a competitive market at the time of the election of a
federal politician, and at the time of re-election, the market
provides no competition during her term, that is, between
elections.179 This amounts to an important disparity with
respect to corporate directors, at least directors of corporations
with publicly-traded stock, who face discipline via the stock
market between the times of their election.180
Even if there is no opposing political candidate to provide
accountability, an incumbent may be held accountable by the
people, an opposing political party, opposing interest groups, or
the press.181 This is not to say that, with limited accountability,
every politician will run amok because honor will lead most
politicians to serve with distinction.182

Rotenberg, The 8 Senate Races Likely to Determine Control of the Senate, ROLL
CALL (June 4, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://perma.cc/7EML-6QGS (“[A]lmost
two-thirds of Senate contests this cycle start as ‘safe’ for the incumbent party
and are likely to remain that way.”).
176. See Somin, supra note 168, at 1655 (“[I]ndividual voters have almost
no chance of actually affecting the outcome of most elections . . . .”).
177. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 126 (referencing the “aggregate
of unorganized individuals—society”).
178. See Somin, supra note 168, at 1657 (“[I]ndividual voters . . . usually
have little or no incentive to make an informed choice.”).
179. But see Rave, supra note 24, at 694 (“Elections can help select agents
who are likely to have similar interests as principals and provide incentives
for agents to act faithfully to increase their chances of reelection.”).
180. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 5 (“The firms and
managers that make the choices investors prefer will prosper relative to
others.”).
181. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 73, at xiii (“In America, among social
pressures is public opinion, expressed in newspapers, television and mass
interaction by electronic devices.”).
182. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (requiring that members of Congress vow to
support and defend the U.S. Constitution and to faithfully discharge the duties
of office).
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b.

Bonding Costs

A fiduciary may bond her interests to the interests of the
beneficiary.183 For example, an attorney-fiduciary may
represent a client on a contingency fee basis. In theory, the
attorney-fiduciary bonds her interest to the interests of her
client; as the amount available to the client increases, the
attorney’s fee increases.184
(1) Directors
Directors may bear bonding costs to align their interests
with the interests of shareholders. Directors, who pay
themselves, may structure their compensation to align their
interests with the interests of shareholders.185 Because
shareholders would like the stock price to increase, directors
may compensate themselves with stock options,186 which
increase in value as the stock price increases.187
Bonding costs may prove ineffective. Stock options may be
poorly-crafted, such that directors benefit in situations where
shareholders are disappointed by the directors’ performance.188
For example, a corporation may have been outperformed
significantly by every member of its peer group, such that the
shareholders of that corporation are disappointed in the
directors. However, if the overall stock market is performing
well, then the stock price of that corporation may have
increased, such that any stock options have over-compensated

183.
184.

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 10.
Cf. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE
ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 7–9 (2009) (discussing
the difficulty of crafting effective incentive compensation for agents in the real
estate market).
185. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h) (West 2020).
186. See id. § 157.
187. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 57 (Del. 2006)
(en banc).
188. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 137–46, 159–73
(2004).
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the directors in light of the corporation’s relatively poor
performance.189
(2) Legislators
Compared to corporate directors, politicians face even
greater difficulties in designing compensation schemes to align
their interests with the electorate. Adjustments to congressional
salaries cannot take effect until after an intervening federal
election.190 Moreover, corporate performance may be reduced to
dollars of profit on an income statement or dollars of increase in
a stock price, for which all shareholders’ interests align. For
politicians, however, measurements of the public’s general
welfare may not be readily translated to compensatory bonuses
or penalties.191 Also, conflicts may arise among blocs of voters
complicating any compensation scheme.192
Some special-interest groups advocate for, and some
politicians support (or acquiesce by signing), political pledges,
perhaps a pledge to oppose new taxes, to oppose any increase to
the debt, or to oppose or support abortion.193 Such pledges are
not enforceable,194 but may serve as a monitoring mechanism
during a subsequent election, especially where the candidate
otherwise may lack a record on which to campaign.195

189. See In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 35, 42, 57 (explaining that,
although an executive was terminated as a poor fit for the corporation, the
executive received approximately $91.5 million because his stock options
increased in value during his brief tenure).
190. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
191. See Davis, supra note 82, at 1150 (“There is no single maximand that
a public official must pursue . . . .”).
192. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ELECTION 2020: VOTERS ARE HIGHLY
ENGAGED, BUT NEARLY HALF EXPECT TO HAVE DIFFICULTIES VOTING 35 (Aug.
13, 2020), https://perma.cc/R2FK-MJVA (PDF) (highlighting that Republicans
and Democrats express different levels of agreement with their own party on
specific issues).
193. See Altman, supra note 140 (“The political pledge is a handy weapon
in the political advocate’s arsenal.”).
194. Members of Congress are bound by an oath to support the U.S.
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
195. See Altman, supra note 140.
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c.

Market Discipline

Where the market provides meaningful discipline, courts
may be less inclined to recognize a fiduciary relationship.196 An
information market and a labor market may discipline a
fiduciary.197 Those markets are addressed above; an information
market facilitates monitoring and bonding, and a labor market
facilitates periodic competitive elections.198 There are other
markets worth addressing. As an important distinction from the
political realm, shareholders of publicly-traded corporations
may easily exit, by selling their shares, or attempt to lessen the
impact of slack by the directors of one corporation by spreading
their investment dollars across many corporations.199 Voters
cannot easily exit one jurisdiction by moving to another
jurisdiction nor can voters diversify against the risk of a
misbehaving politician by having many politicians represent
their district or their state.
“[D]irectors are to shareholders as legislators are to
citizens. If there is a fiduciary relationship recognized in the
former, it is reasonable to recognize a fiduciary relationship in
the latter.”200
C.

Distinguishing Corporate Governance from Political
Governance

While corporate democracy and political democracy share
important characteristics, perhaps counseling in favor of the
usage of corporate common law as an analog to cabin discretion
by legislators, there are important distinctions between
corporate democracy and political democracy, perhaps
undermining the analogy. For starters, federal elections are
196. See Roberta Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, “Contract
and Fiduciary Duty,” 36 J.L. & ECON. 447, 449–50 (1993) (“[H]igh-powered
incentives provided by markets protect the latter group of principals, making
the use of a governance structure—the open-ended fiduciary duty adjudicated
by a court—unnecessary.”).
197. See supra Parts III.B.4.a.–b.
198. See supra Parts III.B.4.a.–b.
199. See Rave, supra note 24, at 707.
200. Kim, supra note 25, at 877.
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premised on “one-person, one-vote,” so no single voter nor small
group of voters control the outcome of an election.201 Corporate
elections, however, are premised on “one share-one vote.”202 So,
a single shareholder could accumulate enough shares to control
an election of a corporation.203 Moreover, corporations may
deviate from the default rule of “one share-one vote,” and
empower one share with multiple votes. 204 Consequently, one
shareholder—say, Mark Zuckerberg—could control the outcome
of the election of a corporation—say, Facebook—even though
that shareholder held a minority of outstanding shares.205 This
corporate-political distinction loses force when shares are
diffusely and widely held, which more closely approximates the
political electorate.206
Federal law does not allow one to “sell” one’s vote;207 and
many critics have expressed concerns about the possibility of
“buying” a federal election through indirect means.208 Corporate
law does not necessarily prohibit the sale of one’s vote.209 More
directly, one can buy a corporate election, so long as one buys
enough shares.210 However, where shares are widely and
201. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495–96 (2019).
202. Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 123 (Del. 1977).
203. See Facebook, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at
38 (Apr. 27, 2016) (reporting Mark Zuckerberg’s control of Facebook).
204. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (West 2020).
205. See Facebook, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at
38 (Apr. 27, 2016) (reporting Zuckerberg’s control of Facebook due to his
super-voting shares).
206. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 25, at 876 (“Shareholders are diffuse [and]
dispersed . . . .”).
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 597; 52 U.S.C. § 10307(c).
208. See William McGurn, Opinion, Will Bloomberg Buy the Election?,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2019, 6:47 PM), https://perma.cc/TX6X-AVAA; Jeremy W.
Peters, Inside the Biggest 2020 Advertising Against Trump, N.Y. TIMES,
https://perma.cc/4QPR-ERRR (last updated Jan. 23, 2020).
209. See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25 (Del. Ch. 1982) (“[T]he
rationale that vote-buying is, as a matter of public policy, illegal per se is
founded upon considerations of policy which are now outmoded as a necessary
result of an evolving corporate environment.”).
210. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (regulating tender offers); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (discussing the tender offer
for 37 percent of outstanding shares by an investor who already owned more
than 13 percent of those shares).
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diffusely held, corporate shareholders more closely resemble the
political electorate.211
While a candidate for Congress may run unopposed in a
primary,212 congressional elections are generally contested. In
the corporate arena, however, annual elections to fill director
vacancies are generally not contested. 213 Nonetheless, the
infrequency of contested corporate elections does not mean that
the law is undeveloped. 214 And, those corporate-law cases that
address directors strategically altering the date of a vote by
shareholders could guide a court in resolving disputes where
political incumbents strategically alter the date of a federal
election.215
Incumbents—whether corporate directors or federal
politicians—enjoy financial advantages, relative to their
challengers, and those incumbents spend “other people’s money”
in their campaigns.216 Similarly, candidates who challenge
incumbent federal politicians spend other people’s money when
campaigning.217 However, shareholders challenging incumbent
directors for seats on the board expend their own resources
211. See Kim, supra note 25, at 877.
212. See Troy Griggs & Adam Pearce, These 20 Representatives Have Not
Had a Primary Challenger for at Least a Decade, N.Y. TIMES, https://perma.cc
/KHU2-6VE4 (last updated Sept. 4, 2018) (“Less than 10 percent of
incumbents get a serious primary challenger, though it’s higher for
Republicans, at 20 percent . . . .”).
213. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule
14A), at 3 (Apr. 27, 2016) (listing eight nominees for eight vacancies);
Cleveland, supra note 132, at 287 n.379 (noting that a nominee to Chesapeake
Energy Corporation’s board received only 26 percent of the vote at the annual
shareholder meeting— the lowest for a nominee of an S&P 500 company in the
prior five years—but was re-elected because there was no competing candidate
that received more votes).
214. See infra Part 0.
215. See infra Part 0.
216. See Bill Allison & John McCormick, Trump Leverages Incumbent
Advantage over Democratic 2020 Pack, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2019, 3:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/5LTM-3TPR (addressing political incumbents); Rosenfeld v.
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 292–93 (N.Y. 1955)
(addressing corporate incumbents).
217. But see Alexander Burns, Michael Bloomberg Joins 2020 Democratic
Field for President, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/4Y6C-FDN4
(last updated Mar. 4, 2020) (reporting that Bloomberg will not accept political
donations in his presidential campaign).
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when campaigning,218 and those campaigns may be
expensive.219
Corporate directors exercise judgment with the primary,
but not necessarily exclusive, goal of benefitting investors
financially.220 This single-overarching goal may enable courts to
more effectively scrutinize directors’ decisions relative to
politicians’ decisions.221 While the political electorate certainly
is concerned about financial considerations,222 a wide array of
considerations motivates the voting populace, which, in turn,
motivates political actors.223 Without a single overarching goal
to guide political actors, except perhaps a standardless “general
welfare,” courts may not as easily scrutinize their decisions.224
This distinction may be overstated. If a court reviews a large
series of decisions by the board of directors, then the court might
be able to determine whether those directors were acting in
218. Corporations could bear such expenses, but generally do not do so.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112–113 (West 2020).
219. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 535–36 (8th ed. 2013) (reporting that
incumbent directors spent $75 million on a proxy campaign); Sharon Terlep &
David Benoit, P&G Says Trian’s Nelson Peltz Has Lost Bid for Board Seat; He
Disagrees, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2017, at A7 (reporting that incumbent
directors spent $35 million on a proxy campaign).
220. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 710–12 (2014)
(listing profit as the “central objective of for-profit corporations,” but
emphasizing that for-profit corporations may pursue—at the expense of
profits—charitable causes, energy-conservation goals, and heightened
employee wages and work conditions).
221. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1158; Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at
523.
222. See, e.g., Lily Rothman, The Story Behind George H.W. Bush’s
Famous “Read My Lips, No New Taxes” Promise, TIME (Dec. 1, 2018, 12:32
AM), https://perma.cc/X33X-SH4B.
223. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ELECTION 2020: VOTERS ARE HIGHLY
ENGAGED, BUT NEARLY HALF EXPECT TO HAVE DIFFICULTIES VOTING 35 (Aug.
13, 2020), https://perma.cc/B79L-WCUK (PDF) (reporting that the top issues
for voters in 2020 are: the economy, health care, Supreme Court appointments,
the coronavirus outbreak, violent crime, foreign policy, gun policy, race and
ethnic inequality, immigration, economic inequality, climate change, and
abortion).
224. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1149 (“[I]n the public law
context, . . . unlike its private counterpart, there is not a consensus about the
interests of beneficiaries . . . .”).
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furtherance of the shareholders’ financial interests. 225 But, if a
court reviews an isolated decision by the board, then the court
will be ill-equipped to determine whether the directors
improperly sacrificed profits if the board pursued some other
permissible non-profit goal, like charity.226 Thus, a court would
defer to the directors’ decision to pursue that non-profit goal,
absent self-interest.227 Self-interest is exactly what would
prompt a court to second-guess a decision by legislators to shift
the date of a federal election.228 Review would be limited to
scenarios, such as where the plaintiff could establish that the
primary purpose of shifting the date of the federal election was
the goal of re-election.229 Courts already examine legislative
purpose in the election context.230
Some suggest that the clearly-identified beneficiaries of
directors—shareholders—better enable courts to scrutinize
directors’ decisions relative to those of legislators.231 Federal
225. See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 84–87 (Del. Ch.
2007) (referencing and upholding a series of decisions by the board).
226. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (West 2020) (“Every corporation
created under this chapter shall have power to . . . [m]ake donations for the
public
welfare
or
for
charitable . . . purposes . . . .”);
BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE— STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION (Aug. 2019),
https://perma.cc/84RN-5LAM (superseding prior statements of shareholder
primacy and stating that the purpose is to create value for
“all . . . stakeholders,” whose long-term interests are inseparable).
227. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
228. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019).
229. See infra Part 0.
230. See N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214–15 (4th
Cir. 2016) (concluding that legislators acted with discriminatory intent);
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005)
But scrutinizing purpose does make practical sense . . . where an
understanding of official objective emerges from readily
discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s
heart of hearts. The eyes that look to purpose belong to an ‘objective
observer,’ one who takes account of the traditional external signs
that show up in the ‘text, legislative history, and implementation of
the statute,’ or comparable official act. (citations omitted).
231. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1158 (“[P]rivate fiduciaries owe a single
beneficiary or a discrete class of beneficiaries a duty of undivided loyalty. It is
difficult, however, to specify how politicians and bureaucrats are fiduciaries
for a discrete class of beneficiaries.”); Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 517, 523
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legislators may owe duties to citizens (in their districts, states,
and country), fellow legislators, and the U.S. government.232
Imposing duties on legislators, without a clearly defined
beneficiary, may prove a fool’s errand. The distinction may be
overblown. First, directors owe duties to shareholders and the
corporation.233 Their interests generally, but not necessarily,
coincide.234 Even focusing on shareholders, and accepting that
directors are to maximize profits—a premise that was disputed
in the prior paragraph—are those directors to maximize
short-term profits, as favored by some shareholders, like
activists and perhaps the elderly, or maximize long-term profits,
as favored by other shareholders, like conservative investors?235
Directors pick winners among a group of beneficiaries in the
same sense that legislators, through their policy choices, pick
winners among a group of beneficiaries.236 Even accepting that
(“All fiduciary mandates imply purposes inasmuch as the fiduciary’s discretion
is to be oriented to the achievement of certain objectives. However, purposes
are distinctive in governance mandates insofar as they are not identified with
determinate persons and their practical interests; they are, in this sense,
abstract.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Democracy’s Boundaries, in
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING
PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 150, 166 (2011) (“Unlike contracts, there is
not a relatively accessible economic presumption that the parties seek to
maximize their joint welfare.”).
232. See Kim, supra note 25, at 870–71; Ponet, Leib & Serota, supra note
25, at 94–97; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943)
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed
to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of
his deviation from duty?
233. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1163–64 (“Traditionally, courts have
imposed fiduciary duties on directors in both close and public corporations to
protect the interests of the corporation and shareholders.”).
234. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721–22 (Del. 1971)
(upholding payment of dividend, which was prompted by the majority
shareholder’s need for cash, and which payment hobbled the corporation’s
ability to pursue its business).
235. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1989) (noting that directors may choose the investment time horizon, whether
long-term or short-term).
236. See Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 524 (“In some cases . . . we can
say with reasonable confidence that we know what demographic . . . is
intended to benefit from a governance mandate . . . .”).
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federal legislators may owe duties to citizens (in their districts,
states, and country), fellow legislators, and the U.S.
government,237 in the context of altering the date of a federal
election, legislators would infringe on citizens’ rights to vote, 238
so that is the relationship of focus.
Other differences between the corporate and political
realms speak to the accountability provided by an election. In
the corporate realm, by default, each shareholder is empowered
to vote for every director, and shareholders can oust all of the
directors at a single election, enhancing accountability of
directors to shareholders.239 In the political realm, the voters in
any district or in any state have no right to unseat the vast
majority of legislators.240 Moreover, given the staggered terms
of federal legislators,241 the voting populace across all
jurisdictions cannot unseat all incumbents in a single
election.242 Perhaps, these distinctions might encourage judicial
intervention when legislators alter the date of an election, given
that courts are prepared to intervene when directors alter the
date of an election.243

237. See Kim, supra note 25, at 870 n.150 (“[T]he STOCK Act explicitly
states that members of Congress owe a fiduciary duty ‘to the Congress, the
United States Government, and the citizens of the United States.’” (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g)(1))).
238. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
239. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(d), 212, 216 (West 2020).
240. See generally United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995)
(concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge allegedly
unconstitutionally drawn district where the plaintiff did not live).
241. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
242. See Chris Cillizza, You Can’t Vote Everyone in Congress Out. So, What
Can You Do?, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2013 11:26 AM) https://perma.cc/4ZEPMTVH (reporting that 60 percent of people polled said they would “replace
every member of Congress, including their own, in the next election if they
could”).
243. See infra Part V.
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IV. Fiduciary Duties
A.

Directors

As fiduciaries, corporate directors owe duties to the
corporation and its shareholders, namely the duty of care and
the duty of loyalty.244 Other obligations may be embedded
within those duties, like the duty of good faith, 245 and, in certain
contexts, those duties may give rise to other obligations.246
Perhaps most pertinent, because shareholders elect directors,
equity bars director-fiduciaries from impeding the shareholders’
franchise.247
1.

Duty of Care

Directors must exercise that amount of care that “ordinarily
careful and prudent [people] would use in similar
circumstances,”248 and, when making decisions on behalf of the
corporation, directors must consider all material information
reasonably available.249 Courts, however, have created a
disparity between the standard of conduct and the standard of

244. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
245. See id. (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith does not establish an
independent duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and
loyalty.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1986) (en banc)
(presuming that the directors acted in good faith when shareholders
challenged their fulfillment of the duty of care); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745–46 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[I]ssues of good faith
are (to a certain degree) inseparably and necessarily intertwined with the
duties of care and loyalty . . . .”).
246. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 357 (Del. Ch.
2008) (“Although usually labeled and described as a duty, the obligation to
disclose all material facts fairly when seeking shareholder action is merely a
specific application of the duties of care and loyalty.” (footnotes omitted)); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284– 85 (Del. 1989)
(applying so-called Revlon duties when directors agreed to sell control of the
corporation for a lesser amount in the face of a superior bid).
247. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
248. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 749.
249. See id.
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liability.250 Courts write in aspirational terms when describing
the care with which directors should operate, but, when
shareholders seek to impose personal liability on directors,
courts require little of directors and require that any
plaintiff-shareholder establish that the board was grossly
negligent as to its decision-making process.251 When reviewing
a shareholder’s challenge to a decision by directors, a court will
employ the business judgment rule, by which the court defers to
the directors, and which presumes that the directors acted with
due care, loyalty, and in good faith.252 Courts do not
second-guess decisions of disinterested directors, except in the
mostly theoretical case of an irrational decision.253 While courts
routinely defer to board decisions, they are much more skeptical
when a plaintiff-shareholder raises the specter that the
directors’ decision was tainted by self-interest, which implicates
the duty of loyalty.254

250. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct
and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437–38
(1993).
251. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55 (Del.
2006) (en banc) (describing aspirational, “best practices” that could have been
employed by a committee of the board and were not employed, but concluding
that liability required the plaintiff-shareholder to prove “gross negligence,” a
standard that was not met); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)
What should be understood, but may not widely be understood by
courts or commentators who are not often required to face such
questions, is that compliance with a director’s duty of care can never
appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content
of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from
consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process
employed. (footnote omitted).
252. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360–61 (Del. 1993)
(“The [business judgment] rule posits a powerful presumption in favor of
actions taken by the directors in that a decision made by a loyal and informed
board will not be overturned by the courts unless it cannot be ‘attributed to
any rational business purpose.’” (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 720 (Del. 1971))).
253. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (en banc)
(“Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.”).
254. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362 (discussing the relationship between
the duty of loyalty and self-interested directors).
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Duty of Loyalty

When a shareholder establishes that a decision by the
directors was tainted by self-interest, a court will not defer to
the directors because the shareholder overcame a presumption
of the business judgment rule—the presumed absence of
self-interest.255
Courts
examine
self-interest
on
a
director-by-director basis.256 Courts’ review of self-interested
conduct may vary with the circumstances.
For example, when corporate directors transact with the
corporation, it is as if those directors are on both sides of the
transaction — negotiating for themselves and negotiating on
behalf of the corporation.257 So, when directors cause the
corporation to pay themselves, whether in fees, bonuses, or
stock options,258 their divided loyalties invite court review, with
the burden falling on the interested directors to establish
fairness.259 Fairness might be established via authorization by
disinterested directors, approval by disinterested shareholders,
or comparable market transactions.260
The fairness inquiry may not be applicable in
self-interested scenarios when directors do not transact with the
corporation. For example, in the past, when a hostile acquirer
made a premium offer to shareholders for their shares and the
board of directors defended against that acquisition, and a
shareholder challenged the board’s defensive action, courts
initially struggled whether to be deferential to the board under
the business judgment rule, or to be skeptical of the board’s

255. See In re Invs. Bancorp, Inc. S’holder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208, 1217 (Del.
2017) (en banc).
256. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 818 (Del. 2019); Beam v.
Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004).
257. See In re Invs. Bancorp, Inc., 177 A.3d at 1217.
258. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 122, 141(h), 157 (West 2020).
259. See In re Invs. Bancorp, Inc., 177 A.3d at 1217 (holding that, when
board members fix their compensation, the decision will generally “lie outside
the business judgment rule’s presumptive protection” (quoting Texlon Corp. v.
Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 257 (Del. 2002))).
260. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144.
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defensive action under the fairness inquiry.261 What if the court
was deferential and upheld the board’s defenses, but the board
members were acting self-interestedly to preserve their
positions, not loyally to the corporation and its shareholders, as
the hostile acquirer would have lined the shareholders’ pockets
and increased the value of the corporation? On the other hand,
what if the court was skeptical of the board’s loyalty and
invalidated the board’s defenses, but the hostile acquirer paid
too little to the shareholders for their shares or the acquirer took
actions that harmed the corporation? Consequently, in Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,262 the Delaware Supreme Court
created an intermediate inquiry, requiring the board to
establish that it undertook a good-faith, reasonable
investigation; that the hostile acquirer posed a threat to the
corporation, its shareholders, or a significant corporate policy;
and that the defensive action was proportional to the threat, not
coercive nor preclusive.263 The court’s inquiry addressed the
“omnipresent specter” that the directors, in defending against
an acquirer, might be acting to preserve their positions, and
further their own interests, rather than the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders.264
Most relevant for present purposes, and as will be explained
in Part IV.A.4, a court may find that the duty of loyalty is
implicated when directors strategically alter the date of an
election, but the court may not invoke the “fairness” inquiry.
Instead, if the plaintiff-shareholder can establish that the
primary purpose of the directors’ action was to impede the
shareholders’ franchise, then the court will require the directors
to establish compelling justification for their action.265

261. See Eisenberg, supra note 250, at 458 (“Over the last twenty years,
corporation law has tried to come to grips with the hostile tender offer—that
is, a general offer to purchase all or a controlling amount of a corporation’s
shares from the shareholders, over management’s objections.”).
262. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
263. See id. at 958–59.
264. See id. at 954.
265. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662 (Del. Ch.
1988).
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Duty of Good Faith

Directors must act in good faith to further the interests of
the corporation and its shareholders.266 Action designed to
violate the law or to harm the corporation results in a violation
of the directors’ duty.267 Moreover, directors do not act in good
faith if they consciously disregard a known duty to act. 268 For
example, because DGCL provides that the business and affairs
of a corporation shall be managed by, or under the direction of,
the board of directors,269 those directors must erect an
information-and-reporting system reasonably designed to
provide the board with timely, accurate information to reach
informed judgments regarding the corporation’s business
performance and its compliance with law.270 As with the duty of
care, with respect to the board’s oversight obligations, there is a
disparity between the standard of conduct and the standard of
liability.271 Even though the standard of conduct references
“reasonabl[eness],” shareholders face great difficulties in trying
to impose personal liability on directors for failures of
oversight.272 Shareholders must establish that “the directors
utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system
or controls; or . . . having implemented such a system or
controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations
thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or
problems requiring their attention.”273

266. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
267. See id. at 370; In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative Litig., No. 5430,
2011 WL 2176479, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
268. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
269. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2020).
270. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
271. Compare id. (referencing reasonably designed oversight system), with
Stone, 911 A.2d at 372 (holding that, to impose personal liability, the plaintiff
must show “sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight”).
272. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 372 (“[A] claim that directors are subject to
personal liability for employee failures is ‘possibly the most difficult theory in
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.’”
(quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967)).
273. Id. at 370.
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Duty Barring Action with Inequitable Purpose

“[W]here corporate directors exercise their legal powers for
an inequitable purpose their action may be rescinded or
nullified by a court at the instance of an aggrieved
shareholder.”274 Thus, directors may be informed (and otherwise
in compliance with the duty of care), and act in good faith to
further the corporation’s interests, not their own interests (in
compliance with the duties of good faith and loyalty), yet a court
may still invalidate their action, if the action furthers an
inequitable purpose.275 The Delaware Supreme Court
announced this principle in a case in which the directors
strategically altered the date of an election, due to the
significance of the shareholder franchise.276 “The shareholder
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the
legitimacy of directorial power rests.” 277 Courts defer to
decisions of the board of directors under the business judgment
rule, in part, because the shareholders elected those directors,
and soon those shareholders will have the opportunity to elect
new directors.278 If, however, the directors impede the
shareholders’ ability to vote, then critical support for the
business judgment rule is weakened. 279 Given the “central
importance of the [shareholder] franchise to the scheme of
274. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121 (Del. Ch. 1990); see
FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 256 (“Doctrinally, equity is the source of the
remedies for violations of fiduciary obligations, because fiduciary obligations
originated in the English equity courts.”).
275. See Stahl, 579 A.2d at 1121 (“An inequitable purpose is not
necessarily synonymous with a dishonest motive. Fiduciaries who are
subjectively operating selflessly might be pursuing a purpose that a court will
rule is inequitable.”).
276. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)
(“[M]anagement has attempted to utilize the corporate machinery and the
Delaware Law . . . for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of
dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy
contest against management. These are inequitable purposes, contrary to
established principles of corporate democracy.”); Stahl, 579 A.2d at 1121
(describing Schnell as the leading case on the matter).
277. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
278. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (West 2020) (establishing, by
default, a one-year term for directors).
279. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659–60.
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corporate governance,”280 courts require that the board of
directors establish compelling justification for its action, if a
shareholder initially establishes that the board of directors
acted with a primary purpose of impeding effective voting by
shareholders.281
Any inquiry into purpose could become a blunderbuss
weapon in the hands of plaintiff-shareholders (inviting
non-meritorious litigation), and any inquiry guided by equity
could become a means of unbridled court intervention
(inconsistent with the business judgment rule).282 However, two
limits merit mention. First, although the principle is phrased
broadly,283 the cases in which courts have resorted to this
principle typically involved a contested election,284 which is
atypical in the corporate realm, so the courts’ application of the
principle has been limited.285 Second, the courts’ own inquiry
limits its application286: the plaintiff-shareholder must establish
that the primary purpose of the board’s action was to impede
the exercise of the shareholders’ franchise before the board is

280. Id. at 659.
281. See id. at 661–62.
282. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360–61 (Del. 1993)
(explaining that the business judgment rule “operates to preclude a court from
imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation”).
283. See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439 (“[I]nequitable action does not become
permissible simply because it is legally possible.”).
284. See Stahl, 579 A.2d at 1121–22 (collecting cases).
285. See Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991)
The invocation of equitable principles to override established
precepts of Delaware corporate law must be exercised with caution
and restraint. Otherwise, the stability of Delaware law is imperiled.
While the doctrine of [Schnell] is an important part of our
jurisprudence, its application, or that of similar concepts, should be
reserved for those instances that threaten the fabric of the law, or
which by an improper manipulation of the law, would deprive a
person of a clear right. (citation omitted).
286. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130 (Del. 2003)
(“[T]he non-deferential Blasius standard of enhanced judicial review, which
imposes upon a board of directors the burden of demonstrating a compelling
justification for such actions, is rarely applied . . . .”).
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required to establish compelling justification.287 If, for example,
the directors delay a vote by shareholders — which vote might
have unseated the incumbent directors — primarily to pursue a
merger that the directors believe is in the shareholders’
interests, then the “compelling justification” standard is not
applicable.288 Moreover, the “compelling justification” standard,
though difficult for directors to meet, has been met,289 so it is
not, by analogy, “strict in theory, [but] fatal in fact.”290 These
cases and the attendant circumstances will be addressed in
subpart V.A.
B.

Legislators

If classified as fiduciaries, federal legislators would be
subject to the traditional duties of care, loyalty, and good
faith.291 The Founders wrote of expectations of legislators, which
correspond to those traditional fiduciary duties. 292 Modern
scholars similarly argue that such duties apply to federal
287. See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121–22; Allen v.
Prime Comput., Inc., 540 A.2d 417, 420 (Del. 1988). Delaware courts
distinguish between an action’s purpose and the directors’ intent. See Linton
v. Everett, No. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (“To set
aside the election results on the basis of inequitable manipulation of the
corporate machinery, it is not required that scienter, i.e., actual subjective
intent to impede the voting process, be shown.”).
288. In such circumstances, a “reasonableness” standard may be
applicable. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56
(Del. 1985). However, actions by directors routinely survive such “reasonable”
scrutiny. See, e.g., id. at 950 (“[W]e are satisfied that the device Unocal
adopted is reasonable in relation to the threat posed . . . .”).
289. See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. Ch. 2007).
290. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 H ARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972) (internal quotations omitted).
291. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 286 (“The different views
concerning the fiduciary laws, both private and governmental, related to
where the lines should be drawn rather than to the principles to be followed.”);
Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 556 (“[F]iduciaries acting under governance
mandates are obligated to be loyal . . . .”).
292. See Natelson, supra note 75, at 1137, 1142–58 (discussing the
Founders’ understanding of fiduciary concepts, such as the duties of
reasonable care, loyalty, and impartiality, and how that understanding
informed their drafting of the Constitution).
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legislators.293 Legislators may owe duties to citizens (in their
districts, states, or country), fellow legislators, and the U.S.
government.294 In the context of altering the date of a federal
election, legislators might infringe on citizens’ rights to vote, so
that is the relationship of focus, in the same way that directors
might infringe on shareholders’ rights to vote, giving rise to a
direct, not a derivative, cause of action.295
1.

Duty of Care

Members of Congress are expected to act with due
care — not irrationally.296 When fulfilling their responsibilities,
like monitoring the other branches and enacting legislation,297
members of Congress require information, which they may
gather by meeting with colleagues, agencies, constituents, and
lobbyists and by convening formal hearings.298 Members of
Congress test their ideas through debate and by proposing

293. See Galoob & Leib, supra note 65, at 164 (arguing that fiduciary
duties are a means of constraining political actors); Natelson, supra note 75,
at 1137, 1142–58, 1178 (same); Ponet & Leib, supra note 79, at 1257–61
(same).
294. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 332 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“Elected officials[’] . . . primary obligations are, of course, to the
public in general . . . .”); Kim, supra note 25, at 870–71 (“Consider the
following potential beneficiaries [of legislators]: citizens, the legislature (and
fellow legislators), and the government that the legislator serves.”).
295. See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S’holder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025,
1049–50 (Del. Ch. 2015).
296. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009)
(subjecting legislation that did not infringe a fundamental right to rational
basis review); Natelson, supra note 75, at 1142–45 (discussing duty of care);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (discussing
a fiduciary-agent’s duties of care, competence, and diligence); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (AM. L. INST. 2012) (imposing on a fiduciary-trustee the
duty of prudence which “requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and
caution”).
297. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1; 2, cl. 5; 3, cl. 6.
298. See Natelson, supra note 75, at 1142 (“James Madison stressed the
need for officials to acquire sufficient knowledge to execute their
functions . . . .”).
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legislation.299 Just as directors are entrusted with discretion to
reject the preferences of shareholders — recognizing that
shareholders soon will vote upon their retention, members of
Congress are entrusted with discretion to reject the preferences
of their constituents — recognizing that those constituents soon
will vote upon their retention. 300 The quantum of care with
which members of Congress must act is contextual. For
example, following the events of 9/11, members of Congress may
have felt the need to take swift action, which may have inhibited
their ability to gather all desirable information and to deeply
consider the viewpoints of competing constituencies.301
However, having taken swift action, and including “sunset”
provisions,302 members of Congress should have, and did,
pause—devoting additional efforts to inform themselves,
consider alternative viewpoints, and debate the statute’s
impact—before continuing the effect of those provisions.303 This
Article presumes that, before amending the U.S. Code to alter
the date of any federal election, members of Congress would
gather information and consider alternatives. Though certain
members of Congress may not be acting loyally, in good faith, or

299. See Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Votes Down Broad
Obamacare Repeal, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/3L62-HH9N
(describing the intense floor debate surrounding the repeal of the Affordable
Care Act).
300. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576
U.S. 787, 793– 94 (2015) (distinguishing a representative government from a
New England town hall meeting).
301. In response to 9/11, and just a few weeks thereafter, Congress passed
the USA Patriot Act on October 26, 2011. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
302. See id. § 224 (“[Except as noted,] this title and the amendments made
by this title . . . shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005.”).
303. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-174, at 5 (2005) (detailing four years of
oversight, including hearing testimony, DOJ reports, briefings, and other
correspondence); see also USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in
scattered sections of U.S.C.); Reauthorization of the Patriot Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2001); DEP’T OF JUST., USA PATRIOT ACT:
SUNSET REPORT (Apr. 2005).
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equitably, those members would likely be acting rationally and
with due care.
2.

Duty of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary to further the
beneficiary’s interest, not to further the fiduciary’s own
interests at the expense of the beneficiary.304 Moreover, the
fiduciary cannot benefit herself, even if the beneficiary is not
harmed, if the fiduciary exploits her position to gain that
advantage.305 The duty of loyalty is reflected in the U.S.
Constitution, which includes provisions designed to prevent
legislators from increasing their own compensation, and to
prevent their corruption by other branches and by foreign
influences.306
The
Founders—whether
Federalists
or
Anti-Federalists— articulated their concerns that legislators’
loyalties would be tested.307 Madison wrote, “When a strong
personal interest happens to be opposed to the general interest,
the Legislature cannot be too much distrusted.”308 Hamilton
argued that it should be “as difficult as possible for [legislators]
to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.”309
An Anti-Federalist publication argued that “those, who are
304. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317–18 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (articulating legislators’ “duty” to govern impartially); 63C AM.
JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 1 (2020) (“Public offices are created
for the purpose of effecting the end for which government has been instituted,
which is the common good, and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of
any one person, family, or class of persons.”).
305. See Kim, supra note 25, at 904–08 (collecting and analyzing cases);
see also Natelson, supra note 75, at 1153 (acknowledging that public officials
necessarily favor one group over another, but noting that, “[e]ven
when . . . [favoring a particular group] was not technically illegal, it [could be]
a violation of the public trust”).
306. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; id. amend. XXVII; see also Natelson,
supra note 75, at 1148 (addressing the length-of-residency requirement for
senators and the natural-born citizen requirement for the President).
307. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 99–106 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937).
308. Id. at 104 (quoting James Madison, Journal (July 24, 1787)).
309. THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
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entrusted with the exercise of the higher powers of government,
ought to . . . hav[e] no other view than the general good of all
without any regard to private interest.”310
The Founders contemplated several remedies if legislators
self-interestedly abused their power.311 The co-equal branches
might check legislators’ self-interested legislation via the
presidential veto or court review.312 Additionally, legislators
collectively might discipline individual legislators via
impeachment.313 Finally, the electorate may vote out of office
those who abuse their office.314 If, however, legislators
self-interestedly alter the date of a federal election, court review
may be the only effective check on those legislators. If the
President and the self-interested legislators are of the same
political party, then the President may support, not veto, such
legislation.315 (Plus, a presidential veto may be overridden.316)
To be enacted, (self-interested) legislation must enjoy the
support of a majority of legislators in each congressional
chamber, such that impeachment on the basis of the enacted
legislation would never occur, where impeachment requires the
majority of one chamber and a supermajority in the other
chamber.317 The concept of strategically altering the date of a
310. Natelson, supra note 75, at 1157 (quoting the Antifederalist Impartial
Examiner).
311. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (ABA Classics ed.,
2009).
312. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
173–80 (1803).
313. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
314. Compare Nicholas Fandos, Trump Acquitted of Two Impeachment
Charges in Near Party-Line Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Q9NN-DSDC (reporting that the Senate acquitted President
Trump of charges that he abused his power and obstructed Congress), with
Meg Wagner, et al., Joe Biden Elected President, CNN, https://perma.cc/8LB77BEG (last updated Nov. 8, 2020, 10:29 A.M.) (reporting that citizens did not
re-elect President Trump).
315. See Alan Greenblatt, 5 Reasons Vetoes Have Gone Out of Style, NAT’L.
PUB. RADIO (May 9, 2013), https://perma.cc/P6N6-D7EA.
316. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
317. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (granting the House of Representatives the
power of impeachment); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“[N]o Person shall be convicted [of
impeachment] without the Concurrence of two thirds of the [Senators]
present.”).
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federal election is to ensure an outcome favorable to the
self-interested incumbents, so the election itself would prove a
poor check on such self-interested behavior, and any subsequent
election could be strategically timed. Consequently, judicial
review may be essential as a check on legislative abuse.318
While judicial review may be essential, the nature of that
review could take many forms. By analogizing politicians to
corporate directors, scholars have suggested that judicial
application of corporate law principles of the duty of loyalty
could curb legislators’ self-interested acts.319 In the corporate
setting, when plaintiff-shareholders establish self-interested
action by directors, courts commonly require those directors to
establish “fairness,” whether procedural fairness (approval of
the action by disinterested directors or shareholders) or
substantive fairness (proof that the terms of the self-interested
action are comparable to the terms that would have been
negotiated by unrelated parties).320
For example, with respect to partisan gerrymandering,
Rave argues that legislators violate their duty of loyalty and
should be subject to the “fairness” inquiry.321 Rave considers
state legislators to be interested when drawing federal districts
designed to benefit federal legislators.322 Rave acknowledges
that, under Madisonian principles, state legislators and federal
legislators are independent, with different interests and
responsive to different constituencies.323 Rave, however,
contends that state legislators are subject to the control of
national political parties, which may choose to support a rival
318. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5 (“[W]here the political process is
unlikely to work, . . . judicial enforcement of the Constitution is most
important.”).
319. See Kim, supra note 25, at 893–908; Rave, supra note 24, at 708–23.
320. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2020).
321. See Rave, supra note 24, at 671 (“[P]olitical representatives should be
treated as fiduciaries, subject to a duty of loyalty, which they breach when
they manipulate election laws to their own advantage. Courts can thus check
incumbent self-dealing in gerrymandering by taking a cue from corporate law
strategies for getting around their institutional incompetence.”).
322. Id. at 686 (“In a world with national political parties, members of
Congress have an interest in state elections and state legislators have an
interest in congressional elections.”).
323. Id. at 685.
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candidate in the primary, if the incumbent strays.324 When a
corporate director is beholden to another person, courts are
concerned that the director will not exercise discretion to further
the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.325 Rave
convincingly argues that state legislators may be beholden to
national political parties; however, he is less convincing that
any such pressure impacts the state legislators’ exercise of
discretion when drawing federal districts,326 because, under
corporate law, courts are not troubled by directors, who act to
further the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, but along the way further their own interests.327
Rave does not persuade the reader that state legislators would
behave differently with respect to establishing federal districts
due to the theoretical pressures exerted by the national political
parties, than those state legislators would have done in the
absence of any such pressure.328 State legislators of a political
party generally believe that the country and their constituents
would be better served if members of their party represented
those newly-crafted federal districts.329 So, by strategically
drawing federal districts, state legislators would be fulfilling
their duty of loyalty by furthering the interests of their
constituents and the country, not violating their duty of loyalty.
324. Id. at 686.
325. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004) (en banc).
326. Rave, supra note 24, at 686 (“If individual state legislators do not
want to go along with a congressional gerrymander . . . .” (emphasis added)).
327. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721–22 (Del. 1971)
(applying the “fairness” inquiry when the fiduciary benefits to the detriment
of the beneficiary, but “fairness” is not applicable when directors take action
that benefits all shareholders, including themselves); see also Pildes, supra
note 22, at 135 (discussing the problem of causation).
328. See Rave, supra note 24, at 686; see also Pildes, supra note 22, at 135
(“Corruption might have meant that legislators had shifted their votes in
response to contributions, or that the legislative agenda had been altered as a
result of such contributions, or that the judgment of policymakers had been
altered in some other way.”).
329. See Jonathan Rauch, The Gerrymandering Ruling Was Bad, but the
Alternatives Were Worse, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/8RXKR4HT (“‘I think electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats,’ David
Lewis, a Republican member of the North Carolina general assembly, told a
redistricting committee. ‘So I drew this map to help foster what I think is
better for the country.’”).
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Though courts should review partisan gerrymandering with
skepticism, the “fairness” inquiry may not be the appropriate
corporate law analog. Nor is the “fairness” inquiry the
appropriate corporate law analog for the judicial review of a
strategic legislative shift of a federal election.
Unlike partisan gerrymandering by state legislators that
impacts other individuals (federal legislators), this Article
addresses action by federal legislators—altering the date of a
federal election—that impacts themselves. So, on a first-pass
analysis, the duty of loyalty is more directly implicated, but
ultimately may not justify judicial intrusion under the
“fairness” inquiry.330 Recall that, under corporate law, a court
undertakes the self-interested inquiry on a director-by-director
basis.331 If one undertakes the self-interested inquiry on a
federal-legislator-by-federal-legislator basis, many—likely a
majority of federal legislators—will not be self-interested. Some
federal legislators do not intend to run for re-election,332 so their
self-interest is not apparent by an alteration of the date of the
next election. Because senators serve six-year terms, most
senators will not be up for re-election at the next federal
election,333 so their self-interest is not apparent. And many of
those members of the Senate who are up for re-election will not
face meaningful challenge at that election.334 So, their
re-election chances are not impacted by whether the election
occurs before early November or after early November, and thus
their self-interest is not apparent. The same holds true for the
many members of the House who will not face meaningful

330. See infra Part 0.
331. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1049 (“The independence inquiry requires us
to determine whether there is a reasonable doubt that any one of these three
directors is capable of objectively making [the pertinent] business
decision . . . .” (emphasis added)).
332. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Jeff Flake, a Fierce Trump Critic, Will
Not Seek Re-election for Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc
/R6DW-XDMB.
333. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
334. See Rotenberg, supra note 175 (“[A]lmost two-thirds of Senate
contests this cycle start as ‘safe’ for the incumbent party and are likely to
remain that way.”).
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challenge in the next election.335 A court would presume that
federal legislators are disinterested, and approval by
disinterested legislators would cleanse any self-interested
action.336 Whether a challenger could overcome those hurdles is
in doubt.337
In the corporate setting, courts acknowledge the presence
of self-interest of directors seeking re-election.338 Nonetheless,
courts will not presume that a director’s interest in seeking
re-election is not in furtherance of the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders.339 A desire to continue serving
with like-minded colleagues is not a disabling self-interest that
triggers judicial scrutiny under the “fairness” inquiry.340 So,
even though courts may be willing to intervene when incumbent
directors manipulate election mechanics and may reference a
violation of the duty of loyalty, courts do not employ the

335. See Bedard, supra note 175 (“The first analysis of the upcoming 2020
congressional election shows that already nearly 8 in 10 members are in “safe
districts . . . .”).
336. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2020) (indicating that
“affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the
disinterested directors [are] less than a quorum” cleanses self-interested
action by one or more board members).
337. Cf. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (en banc) (“[T]he
plaintiff has the burden to plead particularized facts that create a reasonable
doubt sufficient to rebut the presumption that . . . [any of the three directors
were] independent.”).
338. See Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Del. Ch.
1987) (“A candidate for office, whether as an elected official or as a director of
a corporation, is likely to prefer to be elected rather than defeated. He
therefore has a personal interest in the outcome of the election even if the
interest is not financial . . . .”).
339. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658 (Del. Ch.
1988) (“[The board] acted . . . in a good faith effort to protect its incumbency,
not selfishly . . . .”); Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 WL
1805376, at *19 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (finding “no clear conflict of interest
between the directors and the shareholders”).
340. See
Aprahamian,
531
A.2d
at
1206
(“[I]ncumbent
directors . . . seeking reelection . . . are obviously interested in the outcome of
the election . . . . In terming these directors ‘interested’ I am not ascribing any
improprieties to them.”).
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“fairness” inquiry.341 Rather than applying the “fairness”
inquiry to any review of legislative action to shift an election,
courts should consider applying the inquiry introduced in Part
IV.A.4, which will be examined in Part V.
3.

Duty of Good Faith

Federal legislators are required to take an oath to support
the Constitution and that oath includes a good faith
requirement.342 Under corporate law, a violation of good faith
requires (1) intentional illegality, (2) intent to harm, or (3) a
conscious disregard of a known duty to act.343 Extending this
analysis to federal legislators, there currently is no
clearly-defined legal obligation that bars legislators from
strategically altering the date of a federal election. 344 Second, by
strategically altering the date of an election, legislators
arguably intend to disenfranchise certain voters or at least
lessen the effect of their vote. 345 More accurately, however, the
intent of the incumbents—most of whom are not up for
re-election or do not face meaningful challenge—may be to
perpetuate their vision and policies, which, in their good faith
beliefs, operate for the betterment of the country and the

341. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660–63 (requiring that directors establish
“compelling justification” when acting with the “primary purpose of thwarting
the exercise of a shareholder vote”); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d
1115, 1121 (Del. Ch. 1990) (“Fiduciaries who are subjectively operating
selflessly might be pursuing a purpose that a court will rule is inequitable.”).
342. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and
Representatives . . . shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution.”); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (“I will . . . faith[fully support and defend the
Constitution]; and . . . faithfully discharge the duties of the office.”).
343. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64–67 (Del.
2006) (en banc); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (en banc). Such
claims generally are not fruitful for plaintiff-shareholders. See id. at 372
(stating that such a claim is “the most difficult theory in corporation law upon
which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment”).
344. See Alexander Burns, Trump Attacks an Election He Is at Risk of
Losing, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/HA64-SHX6 (reporting
that the power to move the date of the election rests with Congress and that
the “timing of federal elections has been fixed since the 19th century”).
345. See infra Part 0.
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population.346 (Mixed motives may emerge, but it is the primary
purpose of the legislation, not legislators’ primary motive, that
would drive judicial review.)347 Third, with respect to conscious
disregard of a known duty to act, the allegation, in the corporate
setting, typically emerges in cases where the board fails to
monitor employees, who commit illegal acts.348 The corporate
analogy regarding monitoring does not apply meaningfully to
legislators strategically altering the date of a federal election.
Nonetheless, conscious disregard of a known duty to act may
apply to other acts by legislators,349 which are beyond the scope
of this Article.
346. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
347. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative
Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 525 (2016) (arguing that “courts should never
invalidate legislation solely because the legislature acted with forbidden
intentions”); id. at 528 (noting that intent may be considered, “for example, in
cases in which an absolute majority of the legislature acts with forbidden
intent”); Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843, 846
(“[P]roof of bad [legislative] intent should be neither necessary nor sufficient
for an election law challenge to succeed, though it should be relevant in getting
courts to take a hard look at election laws. Rather . . . courts should primarily
examine the effect of election laws . . . .”); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion) (addressing the effect of legislation); Rucho
v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2514 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
districters have set out to reduce the weight of certain citizens’ votes, and
thereby deprive them of their capacity to ‘full[y] and effective[ly] participat[e]
in the political process[].’” (alterations in original)); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 318 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen partisanship is the
legislature’s sole motivation—when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken
unabashedly . . . —the governing body cannot be said to have acted
impartially.”); id. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I would, however, treat any
showing of intent in a major-party case as too equivocal to count unless the
entire legislature were controlled by the governor’s party (or the dominant
legislative party were vetoproof).”); Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of
Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1161 (2018) (“[M]otives inquiries are easier
to administer than commonly believed. Most motive standards do not require
the factfinder to excavate and weigh all motives, nor to predict counterfactual
results if one motive or the other were subtracted[,] . . . because most motive
standards focus on only one motive as directly relevant.”); id. at 1134–43
(noting the seeming simplicity of intent inquiries: any, but for, primary, sole).
348. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 364–65; In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960 (Del. Ch. 1996).
349. See Ian Lovett, Oregon Police Seek GOP Senators, WALL ST. J., June
21, 2019, at A4
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Duty Barring Action with Inequitable Purpose

In certain respects, the duties of care, loyalty, and good
faith are broad, free-ranging, and highly contextual.350 While
judges, lawyers, and professors routinely resort to analogies as
intuitive and persuasive, analogies may be overbroad, and may
lack firm foundational similarities.351 This section strengthens
[T]he entire GOP Senate delegation . . . left the state and went into
hiding . . . in an attempt to stop a cap-and-trade bill to address
climate change from passing. . . . [T]he Senate cannot achieve a
quorum without at least some of the Republicans and therefore
cannot vote on the climate legislation without them.
Nick Madigan, On the Lam, Texas Democrats Rough It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1,
2003), https://perma.cc/DJ8W-THZ4 (reporting that eleven Democratic state
senators fled Texas to deny their Republican counterparts a quorum in an
attempt to prevent a redistricting effort); Bob Bauer, Can the Senate Decline
to Try an Impeachment Case?, LAWFARE (Jan. 21, 2019, 11:10 AM), https://
perma.cc/7DKD-RCKK
[T]he Senate does have this duty to try any impeachment voted by
the House. . . . But such a duty is not the same as a clear-cut
constitutional obligation expressed in the text, and, depending on
events and their political impacts, the Republicans may be
motivated to exploit the difference. . . . No one disputes that there
is no judicial remedy or other means of enforcing the constitutional
duty . . . .
Compare Carl Hulse, That Supreme Court Stonewall May Not Crumble
Anytime Soon, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/554H-P9WX
The idea of denying Mrs. Clinton a court pick has been quietly
simmering in conservative circles as Republicans held firm in their
refusal to take up the president’s nomination of Merrick B. Garland
before the election. . . . Senator Richard M. Burr of North
Carolina . . . promis[ed] to “do everything I can do to make sure four
years from now, we still got an opening on the Supreme Court.”
with Brian Naylor, McConnell Would Fill Potential Supreme Court Vacancy in
2020, Reversal of 2015 Stance, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 29, 2019, 10:50 AM),
https://perma.cc/VMX6-XUCE (reporting a reversal by Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell, a Republican, who refused to allow the Senate to
consider a Supreme Court nominee by a Democratic President during the 2016
presidential campaign, but who would allow the Senate to consider and
confirm a Republican nominee during the 2020 presidential campaign).
350. See supra Part 0.
351. See Kim, supra note 25, at 853, 892–93 (noting that zebras may be
viewed as analogous to barber poles because both are striped); Richard A.
Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L REV. 761, 765 (2006) (“One

Cleveland.Final .docx (Do Not Delete)

1524

1/15/2021 4:45 PM

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1463 (2020)

the director-legislator analogy by examining foundational
similarities.
A court will defer to a rational decision by a corporation’s
board of directors, when a shareholder challenges the decision,
in part, because judges—trained in law—are not well-suited to
second-guess policy decisions by directors, and because the
shareholders elected those directors, and soon those
shareholders can elect new directors.352 If, however, the
directors impede the shareholders’ ability to vote, then a critical
check on director discretion goes wanting, and courts act to
preserve the shareholders’ statutory authority to vote.353
Similarly, courts defer to rational decisions by legislators, in
part, because judges—trained in law—are not well-suited to
second-guess policy decisions by legislators, and because the
voters elected those legislators, and soon those voters can elect
new legislators.354 Akin to the foundational importance of
director elections to corporate governance, “[e]lection day . . . is
the foundation of democratic governance.”355 “Voters . . . choose
their representatives, not the other way around.”356 Legislators,
always requires a general understanding of some sort in order to determine
relevant similarities. In a legal case it is an understanding of rules, principles,
doctrines, and policies. It is they that do the work in reasoning by analogy.”);
Ponet, Leib & Serota, supra note 25, at 92–93 (critiquing another scholar’s
work for making “too-direct” a comparison of fiduciary concepts to election
law).
352. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (West 2020) (contemplating that,
by default, each director serves a one-year term); id. § 141(a) (allocating
decision-making authority to the board of directors, not the court); Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (“Irrationality is the outer limit
of the business judgment rule.”).
353. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130–1131 (Del. 2003)
(requiring that directors establish “compelling justification” when “the
primary purpose of the board’s action is to interfere with” the shareholders’
right to vote).
354. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII, cl. 1; id. amend.
XXIV, § 1.
355. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2512 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
356. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.
Ct. 2652, 2677 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Mitchell N.
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 781 (2005)); see THE
FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 199 (James Madison) (ABA Classics ed., 2009)
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through manipulation of election mechanics, cannot be
permitted to “rig[] elections,” otherwise democracy is
imperiled.357 “[A]ny alleged infringement of the right of citizens
to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” 358
By strategically altering the date of a federal election,
incumbent
legislators
might
act
to
ensure
their
re-election.359 The
Founders— both
Federalists
and
Anti-Federalists—acknowledged this problem.360 It was argued
that the legislature ought not be capable of “alter[ing] itself by
modifying the elections of its own members.”361 Otherwise, the
“great law of self-preservation will prevail.”362 In The Federalist
No. 60, Hamilton acknowledged that incumbent legislators, by
establishing the time of an election, might perpetuate their rule,
and, as a remedy, he envisioned—what today seems an
unrealistic solution—“an immediate revolt of the great body of
the people.”363 Akin to limitations on directors under corporate
law, legislators should not be permitted to deprive voters of their
capacity for “full and effective participation in the political
process.”364 Part V will argue for extending the “primary
purpose-compelling justification” inquiry, which was introduced

(“[R]epublican liberty . . . [requires] that those intrusted [sic] with [power]
should be kept in dependence on the people . . . .” (citation omitted)).
357. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(internal quotations omitted).
358. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
359. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495.
360. See 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 249 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 257 (quoting Charles Turner, Argument and Speech, in 2 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 30 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836)); see 3 ELLIOT, supra,
at 9 (“Congress might cause the election[] to be held . . . at so inconvenient a
time . . . as to give them the most undue influence over the choice, nay, even
to prevent the elections from being held at all—in order to perpetuate
themselves [in office].” (citation omitted)).
363. THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 345 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA Classics
ed., 2009).
364. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565; see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17
(1964) (“Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.”).
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in Part IV.A.4, from the corporate law setting to the legislative
setting.
C.

Distinguishing Corporate Fiduciaries from Legislative
Fiduciaries

Part III.C noted several distinctions between corporate
democracy and political democracy, and those distinctions will
not be repeated here. Scholars have emphasized other
important distinctions. While acknowledging the historical
evidence and the conceptual appeal of treating legislators as
fiduciaries, Seth Davis criticizes the extension of fiduciary
duties from the private realm—say, corporate law—to the public
realm and to legislators.365 Assuming that legislators are
fiduciaries and subject to the classic duties, Davis finds no
historical support that any breach of those duties by legislators
was intended to be privately enforceable.366 Moreover, he
asserts that any enforcement mechanisms were enshrined in
the Constitution—e.g., ousting via impeachment or by the
electorate—not generally bestowed on the courts.367 And to the
extent that the judiciary has a role, Davis envisions its role
would be limited to invalidating “repugnant” laws, which review
is not grounded upon classic fiduciary duties.368 As mentioned
above, if legislation shifted the date of any federal election, such
legislation would have majority support in both chambers,
rendering impeachment an impossibility.369 And, if the shift in
the election date ensured the re-election of the incumbents, then
the ballot box proves an ineffective check, leaving the judiciary,
as a co-equal branch, to check mischief.370
V.

Primary Purpose & Compelling Justification

In the corporate law setting, the plaintiff-shareholder
“rarely” establishes that the primary purpose of the directors’
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

See Davis, supra note 80, at 1171–78.
See id. at 1171–73.
See id. at 1173, 1201.
See id. at 1176.
See supra Part 0.
See supra Part IV.B. 2.
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action was to impede the shareholders’ franchise.371 Part V.A
describes several of those rare situations in which courts
determined that the plaintiff-shareholder did establish such a
primary purpose, which flipped the burden to the directors to
establish compelling justification, a difficult, but not impossible,
onus.372 Part V.B presents concerns of legislator entrenchment
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in scenarios that map
onto the corporate law scenarios of Part V.A. It then discusses
the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of such scenarios, as well as
the resemblance of that analysis to the analysis of courts
presented in Part V.A.
A.

Corporate Elections

When directors authorize an act with a primary purpose of
impeding the shareholders’ franchise, courts invalidate the act
unless the directors establish compelling justification for the
act.373 Altering the date of a vote by shareholders commonly
invites court scrutiny of the directors’ action.374 Even though the
directors’ intent—to the extent that a group of individuals may
act with an intent375—is not specifically at issue,376 directors
may defend against the plaintiff-shareholder’s allegations by
referencing legitimate reasons for taking the act.377 Directors
371. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130 (Del. 2003).
372. See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 819 (Del. Ch. 2007).
373. See Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1132.
374. This Article focuses on common law, but any advance or delay of an
election must comply with pertinent statutory requirements. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (West 2020) (providing that record date for
shareholder’s entitlement to vote at a meeting “shall not be more than 60 nor
less than 10 days before the date of such meeting”); id. § 222(b) (requiring
notice of meeting “not less than 10 nor more than 60 days before the date of
the meeting to each stockholder entitled to vote”).
375. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals
have intentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not.”).
376. See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121–22 (Del. Ch.
1990) (“[I]nequitable conduct does not necessarily require an evil or selfish
motive.”).
377. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 655 (Del. Ch.
1988) (concluding that the board expanded its size to impede the shareholders’
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may not be forthcoming regarding improper motivations and
may downplay any disenfranchising purpose.378 Thus, a court
will focus on the act itself and its effect,379 as well as
circumstances surrounding the directors’ decision to alter the
date of the shareholders’ vote, as illuminating of the primary
purpose of the action.380 Courts have concluded that the primary
purpose of director action was to impede the shareholders’
franchise when: (1) the dissident has, or apparently has,
assembled a majority voting bloc, and the incumbents delay the
vote to retain control or to extend their campaign in hopes of
swinging votes their way; (2) acceleration of the election would
preclude victory by the dissidents or meaningfully hamper their
campaign efforts; (3) a delay in the election would invalidate
previously solicited proxies by the dissident; and (4) the
incumbent directors act to accelerate or delay the meeting in
close temporal proximity to the original meeting date.381

franchise, notwithstanding the court’s conclusion that the “addition of Mr.
Winters, an expert in mining economics, and Mr. Devaney, a financial expert
employed by the Company, strengthened the Atlas board and, should anyone
ever have reason to review the wisdom of those choices, they would be found
to be sensible and prudent”).
378. See id. at 656 (“It is difficult to consider the timing of the [board’s
expansion] . . . as simply coincidental with the pressure that [the hostile
acquirer] was applying.”).
379. See Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376,
at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (“The question of purpose asks for what ultimate
ends were the acts committed.”).
380. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 655–56 (emphasizing that the board’s
challenged action occurred immediately after the dissidents’ attempt to gain
control of the corporation).
381. Other actions by directors—not directly related to shifting the date of
an election—may trigger “primary purpose-compelling justification” judicial
scrutiny. For example, incumbent directors facing defeat at the polls may issue
outcome-determinative voting shares to parties that support them, triggering
heightened judicial scrutiny. See Packer v. Yampol, No. 8432, 1986 WL 4748,
at *1, *9, *15 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986) (enjoining, during a proxy contest,
incumbent directors’ issuance of shares (1) to parties that supported the
incumbent directors, (2) that constituted 44 percent of the total vote, and (3)
at a price below fair market value, when that issuance delivered a “severe, if
not fatal, wound upon the [dissidents’] proxy solicitation,” and that issuance
had the “primary purpose . . . to obstruct [dissidents’] ability to wage a
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Delay to Retain Control or Extend Campaign

In political elections, the electorate may vote by absentee
ballot,382 without visiting a voting booth on election day;
similarly, shareholders may vote by proxy, without attending
the shareholders’ meeting.383 To ensure a quorum and in hopes
of securing support for their recommendations, directors solicit
proxies in advance of a vote by shareholders.384 During any
contested campaign, incumbent directors will have a sense of
whether shareholders support their candidacy, even though
independent third parties may officially tabulate the votes. 385
Fearing defeat, incumbent directors may delay the meeting to
extend their control and to extend their campaign, inviting court
scrutiny upon a shareholder’s challenge.
In Aprahamian v. HBO & Co.,386 the board, in February
1987, announced that the annual meeting—at which
shareholders would elect directors—would be convened on April

meaningful proxy contest in order to maintain themselves in control” (citation
omitted)); Can. S. Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Expl. Co., 96 A.2d 810, 813 (Del. Ch.
1953) (“When the undisputed facts are viewed cumulatively I find it
reasonably to infer that the primary purpose behind the sale of these shares
was to deprive plaintiff of the majority voting control.”); Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del. Ch. 1967)
In view of the haste with which the [directors issued] . . . 75,000
new shares, when a substantially smaller number of shares would
have served the[ir claimed] purpose . . . , I have reached the
conclusion that the primary purpose of the issuance of such
shares was to prevent control of [the corporation] from passing to
[the dissident]. (citation omitted).
382. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3001 (West 2020); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-400
(McKinney 2020).
383. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West 2020) (authorizing proxies).
384. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (regulating the solicitation of proxies); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (authorizing proxies).
385. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231; see also Aprahamanian v. HBO &
Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1205 (Del. Ch. 1987) (reporting that the proxy solicitor
updated incumbent directors of the ongoing vote tally); ExxonMobil Corp.,
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 5 (Apr. 12, 2018) (“Independent inspectors
count the votes.”). While one’s “individual vote [may be] kept confidential”
from the incumbents, no confidentiality is assured regarding an aggregate
assessment of the ongoing tally. Id.
386. 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987).
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30, 1987.387 In late March 1987, dissident shareholders proposed
for election a rival slate of nominees, who would explore a sale
of the corporation, which sale had been opposed by the
incumbent directors.388 In late April, the incumbent directors
reversed their position and agreed to explore the possibility of a
sale of the corporation, but that reversal did not yield adequate
support from shareholders to assure their re-election.389 So, on
the eve of the election, with their likely defeat at the polls
imminent, the incumbent directors postponed the annual
meeting by almost five months.390 When the postponement was
challenged, the court concluded that the shareholders
established that the “election machinery . . . had been
manipulated,” resulting in the incumbent directors bearing the
“burden of persuasion to justify their actions.” 391 While
accepting the incumbent directors’ argument that shareholders
should be informed when they vote, the court ultimately rejected
their argument that disclosure justified the delayed vote
because the board had ample time to educate shareholders
about the rival slate of nominees, and because the incumbent
directors’ new plan of sale was substantially similar to the
dissidents’ plan of sale, such that additional time for disclosure
was not warranted.392 The court preliminarily enjoined the
directors’ attempt to delay the vote.393
In Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc.,394 the incumbent
directors learned, in late March, that their re-election would be
challenged by the nominees of a dissident shareholder. 395 The
387. Id. at 1205.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 1207.
392. See id. (“If the incumbent directors were truly sincere in their desire
to make sure that the stockholders are fully informed before voting, they
would . . . not have waited until the evening before the meeting date.”).
393. Id. at 1209; see MFC Bancorp v. Equidyne Corp., 844 A.2d 1015, 1022
(Del. Ch. 2003) (ordering incumbent directors to convene a meeting of
shareholders, when they inequitably delayed a meeting in the face of a
contested election).
394. 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980).
395. Id. at 909.
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corporate bylaws provided for an annual meeting in
mid-June.396 In mid-April, the incumbent directors amended the
bylaws to grant themselves discretion to establish the date of
the annual meeting and to require any dissident shareholder
that would be proposing nominees for election to provide
specified information seventy days before the annual
meeting.397 On August 1, 1980, the board fixed October 3, 1980
as the date of the annual meeting of shareholders; that is, the
board established the date of the meeting sixty-three days
before it was to be held, precluding the dissident from complying
with the seventy-day notice requirement to initiate a contested
election.398 The court invalidated the contested bylaw
amendment.399 Rejecting the incumbent directors’ claimed test
of “reasonableness” and finding irrelevant their claim that the
bylaw was not “specifically adopted to thwart the intentions of
the challenger [as evidenced by] the time and assistance [they]
afforded [the dissident],”400 the court concluded that the
directors’ actions, “whether designedly inequitable or
not, . . . had a terminal effect on the aspirations” of the dissident
shareholder.401
In Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,402
dissident shareholders began accumulating shares of a
corporation, which originally was to have an annual meeting of
shareholders on May 13, 1986.403 After the dissident
shareholders acquired a majority of outstanding shares and
announced their intention to nominate and elect a rival slate of
candidates for the open board seats, the incumbent directors
cancelled the shareholder meeting scheduled for May.404 The
board rescheduled the election for June, but the board

396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 911.
399. Id. at 914.
400. Id. at 913.
401. Id. at 912 (citation omitted).
402. No. 86 Civ. 3499, 1986 WL 7001 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1986).
403. Id. at *1–2 (interpreting New Jersey corporate law).
404. Id. at *2. Because the corporation had a staggered board of directors,
only three of eight board seats were up for election. Id.
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revealed—during litigation—that it may postpone the election
of directors again, perhaps indefinitely.405 Under New Jersey
corporate law, courts apply “special scrutiny” when directors
“manipulate the timing of the shareholders’ annual meeting to
perpetuate [their] reign of control” by “restrict[ing] the ability of
shareholders to replace them.”406 The court preliminarily
enjoined the incumbent directors from postponing the annual
meeting of shareholders from the rescheduled date that they
had already noticed.407 Delaware courts similarly have struck
down incumbent directors’ actions to delay the effect of the will
of the majority of shares, but in the context of shareholders
taking action outside of a duly-convened meeting.408
Judicial skepticism extends beyond delayed director
elections to other delayed votes. In State of Wisconsin
Investment Board v. Peerless Systems Corp.,409 the board of
directors convened an annual meeting of shareholders, and
those directors were re-elected, but a board-sponsored proposal
would have been defeated by shareholders.410 Rather than
accept defeat, the board adjourned the meeting without closing
the polls on that proposal. 411 Thirty days later, the board
reconvened the meeting and secured slim passage for its
proposal.412 The board delayed the vote to overcome the
shareholders’ defeat of the proposal, not to increase low voter
participation, otherwise, the board would have alerted
405. Id. at *3, *12.
406. Id. at *13.
407. See id. at *12.
408. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (West 2020) (empowering
shareholders to act by written consent outside of a duly-convened meeting,
without prior notice, and without a formal vote); Allen v. Prime Comput., Inc.,
540 A.2d 417, 420 (Del. 1988) (finding that a “bylaw whose real purpose is
delay of shareholder action is per se unreasonable”); Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza
Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 1985) (striking down a bylaw adopted by
defendant-directors that arbitrarily delayed shareholder action to “provide the
incumbent board with time to seek to defeat the shareholder action by
management’s solicitation of its own proxies, or revocations of outstanding
shareholder consents”).
409. No. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000).
410. Id. at *3–4.
411. Id. at *4.
412. Id. at *5–6.
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shareholders that the polls remained open and encouraged their
participation in the vote, which did not occur.413 The directors
effectively conceded that, if there had been enough votes to
secure passage of the proposal at the regularly-scheduled
meeting, then there would have been no adjournment of that
meeting.414 While not disputing the directors’ good faith nor
their disinterestedness, the court concluded that the board
acted with a primary purpose to impede the shareholders’
franchise and denied the directors’ motion for summary
judgment.415 The court expressed doubt that the board could
establish compelling justification for its actions but allowed it
the opportunity to do so.416
An oral ruling by a federal district court reached a similar
conclusion, applying similar logic, regarding a contested
acquisition.417 In Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Conrail, Inc.,418 the
directors of Conrail solicited shareholders to approve the
corporation’s proposed sale to CSX. 419 However, Conrail’s
directors notified its shareholders that the meeting would be
convened only if there was sufficient support to approve the
transaction with CSX, otherwise the meeting would be
postponed or cancelled.420 The judge orally ruled that Conrail’s
directors could not “disenfranchise the shareholders by putting
off a stockholder meeting until [they have] enough support for a
merger with CSX,” otherwise the meeting and the vote would
amount to a “sham.”421

413. Id. at *10–12.
414. Id. at *11.
415. See id. at *11–12.
416. See id. at *19.
417. See Frank Reynolds et al., Judge Says Conrail Cannot Delay Merger
Vote Until It Is Sure that It Will Win, 1997 ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP.
19611, 19624.
418. No. 96-7167, 1997 WL 33463657 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1997).
419. See Reynolds et al., supra note 417, at 19624.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 19625.
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Acceleration that Precludes or Hampers the Dissident’s
Campaign

Usually, corporate elections to fill director vacancies are not
contested, as there is usually only one nominee per vacancy.422
When incumbent directors face a contested election, directors
may accelerate the date of the vote, which may preclude
dissidents from attaining any seats on the board or which may
limit their opportunity to campaign and significantly hamper
their success in attaining any seats on the board. Courts view
such actions with skepticism.
In Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,423 the
corporation’s bylaws established an annual meeting at which
shareholders would elect directors for the second Tuesday in
January.424 In mid-October, almost immediately after the
incumbent directors learned that dissident shareholders would
nominate a rival slate of candidates for election to the board, the
incumbent directors amended the bylaws to accelerate the
meeting by approximately one month, from early January to
early December.425 The Chancery Court concluded that the
incumbent directors “disingenuously resisted the production of
a list of its stockholders,” which was necessary for the
dissidents’ campaign, and that the incumbent directors
accelerated the meeting “for the purpose of cutting down on the
amount of time which would otherwise have been available to
[dissidents] for the waging of a proxy battle.”426 The Delaware
Supreme Court emphasized that dissidents would gear the
timing of their election campaign to the date set forth in the

422. See Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A
Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 408 (1983) (identifying only
ninety-six proxy contests over a sixteen-year period, or an average of six proxy
contests per year); Facebook, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule
14A), at 3 (Apr. 27, 2016) (listing eight nominees for eight vacancies).
423. 285 A.2d 430 (Del. Ch.), rev’d, 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
424. Id. at 431–32.
425. See id. at 431–32, 434.
426. Id. at 434; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219 (West 2020) (requiring a
corporation to prepare a list of all stockholders entitled to vote at least ten
days before a meeting to, among other things, allow the dissidents to compete
for shareholders’ votes).
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bylaws.427 Because the incumbent directors accelerated the date
of the vote, the dissidents were “given little chance” to unseat
the incumbent directors “because of the exigencies of time,
including that required to clear material at the SEC, to wage a
successful proxy fight.”428 The Delaware Supreme Court struck
down the bylaw amendment accelerating the date of the vote
because the directors “attempted to utilize the corporate
machinery . . . for the purpose of perpetuating [their time] in
office . . . and . . . for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate
efforts of dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to
undertake a proxy contest.”429 Over time, this inquiry from 1971
evolved to become the “primary purpose-compelling
justification” inquiry utilized in Delaware and other
jurisdictions.430
In Shoen v. AMERCO,431 the District Court of Nevada,
interpreting Nevada corporate law, adopted Delaware’s
“compelling justification” standard if the incumbent directors’
action had “the primary purpose of interfering with the
effectiveness of a stockholder vote.”432 Akin to the Schnell case,
the incumbent directors, in early May, amended the bylaws to
accelerate the date of the meeting at which shareholders would
427. See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439.
428. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n (regulating the solicitation of proxies); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14.a (2020) (same); Filing Review Process, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://perma.cc/PN66-XYTS (last modified Sept. 27, 2019) (requiring
companies to file documents “when they engage in . . . proxy solicitations”).
429. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439 (citation omitted); see Lenahan v. Nat’l
Comput. Analysts Corp., 310 A.2d 661, 664 (Del. Ch. 1973) (declining to enjoin
election on claim that dissident lacked sufficient time to solicit proxies, where
notice of meeting complied with bylaws and dissident belatedly launched
proxy contest after being dropped from incumbents’ slate of nominees shortly
before the annual meeting).
430. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Del. 2003)
(“Accordingly, the incumbent board of directors had the burden of
demonstrating a compelling justification for that action to withstand enhanced
judicial scrutiny . . . .” (citation omitted)); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,
564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (assessing whether a board of directors had
a compelling reason to “validly act for the principal purpose of preventing the
shareholders from electing a majority of new directors”), vacated by settlement,
No. CV-N-94-0475, 1995 WL 936692 (D. Nev. Feb. 10, 1995).
431. 885 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Nev. 1994).
432. Id. at 1341 (quoting Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659).
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elect directors from September 24 to July 21.433 The incumbent
directors controlled the corporation because they controlled the
votes of shares subject to a shareholders’ agreement, which
included transfer restrictions.434 However, the dissident
shareholder was arbitrating the validity of the transfer
restrictions included in that agreement.435 The arbitration was
expected to be resolved in early September, before the election
of directors, and, if the dissident was successful in the
arbitration, then the incumbents likely would have lost control
of the corporation.436 Fearing that the dissident might succeed
in the arbitration, the incumbent directors, in late April, caused
the corporation to seek an order restraining the arbitration, but
the court rejected the request.437 So, in early May, the
incumbent directors amended the bylaws to accelerate the
election by two months. 438 By accelerating the date of the
election, the incumbent directors “narrowed . . . the range of
choices available” to shareholders, due to the dissident’s
“consequent inability to campaign.”439 While the court suspected
that the incumbent directors were aware of the dissident’s
intent to campaign for board seats at the time of their decision
to accelerate the date of the election, the court emphasized the
incumbent directors’ knowledge of the dissident’s attempt to
terminate the shareholder agreement, and their own failed
attempt to enjoin the arbitration that could result in a loss of
the incumbents’ control of the corporation.440 The court rejected
as pretextual the incumbents’ asserted business justifications
for accelerating the date of the election, 441 and concluded that
they “advanced [the vote] for the purpose of interfering with the
free and fair voting by the shareholders, . . . afraid that they

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id. at 1341–42.
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1336–37.
See id. at 1338.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1343–44.
Id. at 1342–44.
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would lose an election” if held as originally scheduled.442 Given
that the dissident shareholder carried his burden, the
incumbents were required to establish “compelling
justification,” but they offered “no justification that [was]
convincing, let alone compelling.”443
3.

Alteration of the Meeting Date Would Invalidate Proxies

Though some shareholders attend the annual meetings at
which directors are elected, shareholders generally do not
attend such meetings, and instead, they vote by proxy.444
Altering the meeting date could invalidate the dissident’s
previously solicited proxies, which consequently invites court
scrutiny.445
In Aprahamian v. HBO & Co.,446 discussed in Part V.A.1,
the court enjoined the incumbent directors’ attempt to further
postpone the annual meeting of shareholders by five months.447
The court expressed concern regarding the impact of delay upon
the proxies that had already been solicited by the dissident
shareholders.

442. Id. at 1344.
443. Id. at 1355; see id. (enjoining the meeting to allow solicitation of
proxies); see generally Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182,
1194–95 (Del. 2010) (en banc) (preventing insurgent from amending the
bylaws to accelerate the date of the annual meeting by approximately eight
months, where the board served staggered terms and the applicable statute
contemplated each election would be separated by about one year).
444. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West 2020); see also John D. Stoll,
Are Annual Meetings Still Necessary?, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2015, 4:03 PM),
https://perma.cc/XGU4-RAQ6 (“GM’s annual meeting [of shareholders] took
place with less than three dozen attendees . . . . Influential investors aren’t
showing up.”).
445. In 2019, Facebook, Inc. solicited proxies that contemplated the
possibility of an adjournment or postponement, but not an advancement of the
scheduled meeting date. Facebook, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule
14A), at 74 (Apr. 12, 2019) (“The undersigned hereby appoints David . . . and
Colin . . . , as proxy holders . . . to vote . . . [at] the Annual Meeting of
Stockholders, to be held on May 30, 2019 . . . and at any adjournments or
postponements thereof.” (emphasis added)).
446. 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987).
447. See id. at 1205.
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[They] expended considerable sums of money on th[e] proxy
contest. If the meeting [had been] postponed, arguably, the
proxies solicited and returned in good faith by the
stockholders w[ould have] become void and a postponement
may well [have] defeat[ed] the[ir] efforts . . . and the will of
the majority of the stockholders. Irreparable harm may be
assumed in such a case.448

In Gintel v. Xtra Corp.,449 the court distinguished
Aprahamian and authorized a brief delay of the annual meeting
of shareholders at which directors would be elected.450 The court
emphasized that, while the directors in Aprahamian sought a
five-month delay, the incumbent directors in Gintel sought only
a thirty-day delay, and the court approved only a fifteen-day
delay.451 Moreover, in Aprahamian, the incumbent directors
would have had to set a new “record date” that jeopardized the
validity of previously solicited proxies, while in Gintel, “the
same record date [was] preserved [and] the proxies . . . in hand
[remained] effective.”452
Relatedly, courts are less troubled by a delayed election
when the parties have not yet commenced competing for
shareholders’ votes, as there would be no invalidation of any
proxies and any such delay is less likely to have a primary
purpose of impeding the shareholders’ franchise. In Stahl v.
Apple Bancorp,453 the incumbent directors intended to hold the
election for directors in mid-May, and they, in mid-March,
established the “record date,” which, in turn, established the
fifty-day timeframe within which the election would be held.454
In late March, the dissident shareholder alerted the incumbent
448. Id. at 1208.
449. No. 11422, 1990 WL 1098684 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 1990).
450. See id. at *1.
451. See id. at *1, *3 (concluding that a fifteen-day delay appropriately
balanced the shareholders’ interest in reviewing new information while also
preventing the incumbent board from negotiating a transaction before the
shareholder meeting).
452. Id. at *1.
453. 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990).
454. Id. at 1119 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213 (West 2020) (“[T]he
board of directors may fix a record date, which . . . shall not be more than 60
nor less than 10 days before the date of such [a] meeting [of shareholders].”)).
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directors of his intent to nominate a rival slate of candidates and
to acquire the company by a tender offer.455 Soon thereafter, and
before specifying the election date, the incumbent directors
withdrew the record date, thereby enabling them to hold the
election later than originally intended; but, they did so not with
a primary purpose to forestall the election of directors—instead
they sought additional time to explore an alternative
transaction to the one proposed by the dissident.456 As the
primary purpose of the delay was not to impede the
shareholders’ franchise, the “compelling justification” standard
was not implicated.457 Because no meeting date had been set and
because no proxies had been solicited, the delayed meeting did
not impair the shareholders’ franchise.458 The court was
comforted by the temporal separation between the board’s act
and the originally intended meeting date.459
4.

Temporal Proximity Between the Directors’ Action and the
Meeting Date

Closeness in time between the board’s act to alter the date
of an election and the election itself invites judicial scrutiny.460
The DGCL once required that the bylaws establish the date on
which directors would be elected and also barred any change of
that date within sixty days of the election.461 The purpose of that
former statutory provision was to “insure against a sudden
change” of the date of the election.462 Though the Delaware
legislature subsequently eliminated the statutory bar to last

455. Id. at 1117.
456. Id. at 1119–20, 1122–23.
457. See id. at 1124 (applying the intermediate scrutiny of Unocal and
finding that the incumbent directors’ action passed muster).
458. See id. at 1123.
459. Id. at 1125 (“As one moves closer to a meeting date and closer to the
announced conclusion of a contested election, attempts to postpone a meeting
would likely require a greater and greater showing of threat in order to justify
interfering with the conclusion of an election contest.”).
460. See id.
461. See In re Tonopah United Water Co., 139 A. 762, 764 (Del. Ch. 1927)
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 1944 (1915)).
462. See id.
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minute changes of the date of the directors’ election,463 common
law may bar such changes.
Closeness in time between an originally scheduled vote and
the directors’ decision to change the date of the vote, standing
alone, may not justify application of the “compelling
justification” standard.464 Nonetheless, such closeness in time
will arouse a court’s suspicions. “As one moves closer to a
meeting date and closer to the announced conclusion of a
contested election, attempts to postpone a meeting would likely
require a greater and greater showing . . . to justify interfering
with the conclusion of an election contest.” 465 In Aprahamian v.
HBO & Co.,466 the directors waited until the eve of the meeting
date before attempting to postpone the election, which attempt
was enjoined.467 While directors and courts favor an informed
vote, the court doubted that “the incumbent directors were truly
sincere in their desire to make sure that the stockholders [were]
fully informed before voting,” otherwise the delay could have
been announced earlier, as opposed to the eve of the election,
when they learned of their likely defeat.468 Similarly, in Condec
Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.,469 the court invalidated director
action taken in close temporal proximity to the meeting, which
action had a disenfranchising effect.470
B.

Political Elections

When addressing voting rights cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court has articulated concerns that mirror certain of those
identified and addressed by courts in the corporate law setting:
incumbent entrenchment, limitation of voter choice by
limitation on dissident candidates and dilution of blocs of voters.
463. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (West 2020).
464. See Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Operating Co., No. 11902, 1991 WL
1182611, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (“[D]elay alone [does not]
produc[e] . . . irreparable harm.”).
465. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124–25 (Del. Ch. 1990).
466. 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987).
467. Id. at 1208–09.
468. Id. at 1207.
469. 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
470. Id. at 775.
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In addressing those concerns, the justices have resorted to
various theories when addressing partisan legislative action
that insulates incumbents from challengers, including the
association and free speech rights under the First Amendment,
the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and more abstract structural
principles of democracy.471 Moreover, the justices have applied
levels of review ranging from strict scrutiny to rational basis.472
Regarding the Court’s analysis in voting rights cases, there is
“little sense of an organizing principle.”473 Part V.B.1 addresses
those areas that raise judicial concern in both corporate
elections and political elections. Part V.B.2 addresses the U.S.
Supreme Court’s analysis in voting rights cases that present
issues of entrenchment and notes similarities between that
analysis and the analysis of Delaware courts when addressing
allegations regarding entrenching actions by corporate
directors.
1.

Entrenching Political Incumbents

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed concern
that political incumbents may legislate to entrench themselves

471. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 356–60 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (applying structural principles of democracy); Norman v. Reed, 502
U.S. 279, 288 & n.8 (1992) (applying rights derived from the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, but specifically not applying the Equal Protection
Clause); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (applying the Equal
Protection Clause).
472. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
184–85 (1979) (requiring that state legislation that imposed signature
requirements that varied by office to further “compelling interest” by “least
drastic means”); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973) (upholding
legislation that delayed enrollment in a political party because it was “tied to
a particularized legitimate purpose, and [was] in no sense invidious or
arbitrary”).
473. Pildes, supra note 22, at 39; see id. at 97 (“[L]egal academics and
many judges . . . are better trained to think in terms of rights, participation,
representation, and quality than in terms of material issues of political
power.”).
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or members of their party.474 While, in the corporate setting, the
Delaware courts have addressed the issue of incumbent
directors strategically altering the date of an election to
entrench themselves in office,475 the U.S. Supreme Court has
not addressed a similar scenario involving federal legislators.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has addressed other
legislative action that entrenches incumbent politicians in
scenarios like those addressed by Delaware courts with respect
to entrenching action by incumbent corporate directors.476
a.

Limitation of Voter Choice by Limitation on Dissident
Candidates

In the corporate setting, shareholders typically are not
presented with alternatives to the corporation’s own nominees
to fill director vacancies; typically, there is only one nominee per
vacancy.477 So, in the atypical situation, when a dissident
shareholder proposes a rival slate of nominees to fill director
vacancies, the incumbent directors—who seek re-election—may
take action that limits the choices available to shareholders. As
discussed in Part V.A, courts review such actions by incumbent
directors with skepticism.
In the political setting, citizens generally are presented
with two candidates (a Republican and a Democrat), but either
or both of those parties may take action to limit the choices
available to citizens by limiting the participation of third-party

474. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576
U.S. 787, 791 (2015) (criticizing partisan legislative action that “subordinate[s]
adherents of one political party and entrench[es] a rival party in power”);
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006)
(criticizing partisan legislative action that “entrenches an electoral minority”);
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971) (criticizing partisan legislative
action that “freeze[s] the status quo”); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484, 2509 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing partisan legislative action
that “enable[s] politicians to entrench themselves in office as against voters’
preferences”).
475. See supra Part 0.
476. See, e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184 (protecting voters’
rights by invalidating legislation limiting ballot access).
477. See Facebook, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at
3 (Apr. 27, 2016) (listing eight nominees for eight vacancies).
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candidates.478 The Supreme Court has viewed such actions with
skepticism.479 Importantly, the Court has protected voters, who
suffered a legal harm when the legislature took action that
limited a dissident’s access to the ballot as an infringement on
voters’ rights.480
Whether in a corporate election or a political election, the
courts have struck down regulations that preclude a dissident
candidate from appearing on the ballot. Consider first a
corporate election. In Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc.,481 the
incumbent directors crafted a bylaw that required any dissident
shareholder to notify the corporation “x” number of days before
the election of the dissident’s nominees, but the incumbent
directors announced the date of the election less than “x” days
before the election was to occur, entirely precluding the
shareholders’ consideration of the dissident’s nominees.482 The
court refused to enforce the bylaw, which “had a terminal effect
on the aspirations” of the dissident shareholder.483 Turning to
the political realm, in Williams v. Rhodes,484 the Supreme Court
struck down state election laws that made it “virtually

478. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (criticizing regulations
that “give the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new
parties”).
479. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184 (“Restrictions on access
to the ballot burden two distinct and fundamental rights, ‘the right of
individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right
of qualified voters . . . to cast their votes effectively.’”); Williams, 393 U.S. at
24 (finding that the state failed to show any compelling interest to justify its
burden restricting new political parties’ placement on the ballot).
480. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (“Our primary
concern is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions ‘to limit the field of
candidates from which voters might choose.’” (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134, 143 (1972))); Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184 (“By limiting
the choices available to voters, the State impairs the voters’ ability to express
their political preferences.”).
481. 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980).
482. Id. at 911.
483. Id. at 912.
484. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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impossible” for a new political party to have its candidates
placed on the ballot.485
If incumbent politicians accelerate the date of an election to
hamstring the campaign efforts of any challengers, then those
incumbent politicians will deprive the voters of information
about those challengers, effectively limiting the voters’ choices,
which should invite judicial scrutiny.486
b.

Dilution

Under corporate law, incumbent directors cannot dilute the
will of a majority of shares by, for example, issuing additional
shares.487 Similarly, “in the original malapportionment
cases, . . . judicial
review
was
necessary
to
ensure
majoritarianism.”488 “[W]hen qualified voters elect members of
Congress, each vote [is] to be given as much weight as any other
vote . . . .”489 “To say that a vote is worth more in one district
than in another . . . run[s] counter to . . . fundamental ideas of
democratic government . . . .”490 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly expressed concern about legislative action that

485. Id. at 24; see id. at 31 (criticizing regulations that “give the two old,
established parties a decided advantage over any new parties”). Nonetheless,
whether in a corporate election or a political election, the courts have
permitted an early notification process by which the incumbents and the
voters may learn about new candidates when the process does not
meaningfully limit the dissident candidate’s appearance on the ballot. See
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434–35 (1992) (upholding bar on write-in
candidates because of the relative ease by which dissidents may appear on
ballots); Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Cap. Partners Master Fund I, Ltd.,
924 A.2d 228, 238–39 (Del. Ch. 2007) (upholding advance notice bylaw).
486. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“The first instinct of power is the retention of
power, and under a Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is the
best achieved by the suppression of election-time speech.”).
487. See Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 776 (Del. Ch.
1967); Can. So. Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Expl. Co., 96 A.2d 810, 813 (Del. Ch. 1953).
488. Pildes, supra note 22, at 72; see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484, 2513–14 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Partisan gerrymandering
operates through vote dilution— the devaluation of one citizen’s vote as
compared to others . . . .”).
489. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
490. Id. at 8.
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dilutes one’s voting power.491 Legislative action should not
render votes that would otherwise constitute a majority as
insufficient to carry the election.492
Will third-party aggregators of information enable
increasingly accurate predictions of election outcomes that
approach prescience?493 Will technological advancements result
in the populace voting, perhaps by phone application, prior to
the election date?494 As legislators gain access to likely election
outcomes prior to the elections themselves, will those legislators
act so as to upset an anticipated, unfavorable outcome?495 If,
fearing defeat as the election drew near,496 incumbent
legislators altered the date of the election and secured their
re-election, then the legislative action would effectively dilute
the votes that would have comprised a majority (and would have
supported opposition candidates) during the regularly
scheduled election. This would enhance the voting power of
those voters who did support the incumbents and did comprise
a majority at the time of the rescheduled election. True, the
legislation would not directly dilute (or enhance) anyone’s vote,
491. See id. at 7 (“The apportionment statute thus [impermissibly]
contracts the value of some votes and expands that of others.”); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote . . . .”); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (“How . . . can one person be given twice or 10 times
the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because he
lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county?”).
492. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 559 (“[L]egislatures may not . . . give some
voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others.”); Gray, 372
U.S. at 379–81 (striking down a state election scheme where one who secures
the most counties secured the vacant seat, even though that candidate may
not have secured a majority of votes).
493. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2511–13 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(discussing the effects of advancements in computer technology on
gerrymandering).
494. Cf. Mobile Passport Control, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://
perma.cc/B5DZ-7E5K (last updated June 17, 2020, 3:35 PM) (discussing a
phone application that dispenses with the need for paperwork upon re-entry
to the United States).
495. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (barring disparate
review of voters’ intent during recount, due to risk of partisan manipulation
controlling the election outcome).
496. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 35 (1968) (acknowledging
last-minute concerns, especially with respect to absentee voters).
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but courts review the effect of legislation, and its effect would be
dilutive. Diluting the vote by stuffing the ballot box is illegal.497
Delaying an election to enable additional favorable votes,
though technically permissible, should be met with judicial
skepticism, like in the corporate setting.498
c.

Absentee Voting

In the corporate setting, shareholders may vote by proxy
without attending the meeting at which the election is held.499
Similarly, states commonly allow qualified voters to vote
in-person before the date of the election and by absentee ballot
without visiting a voting booth on the day of the election.500 In
the corporate setting, courts view with skepticism action by
incumbent directors that invalidates shareholders’ proxies.501 If
federal legislators accelerate the date of a federal election, but
not well in advance of that election, such action could limit the
window in which voters could qualify for absentee voting. 502 If
federal legislators delay the date of a federal election, but not
well in advance of that election, such action might invalidate
absentee ballots.503 Courts should scrutinize federal legislative
action that invalidates votes that would have been valid but for
the legislation action.504 Federal legislators, however, could
likely skirt such dire consequences. The Constitution empowers
497. See United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 389 (1944); Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 378 (1879).
498. See supra Part 0.
499. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b) (West 2020) (authorizing proxies).
500. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3000–3001, 3017–3018 (West 2020)
(addressing vote-by-mail); N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 8-400, 8-600 (McKinney 2020)
(addressing early in-person voting and vote-by-mail).
501. See supra Part 0.
502. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3001 (requiring application for absentee ballot
be submitted “between the 29th and 7th day prior to the election”); N.Y. ELEC.
LAW § 8-400(d) (requiring the state to mail an absentee ballot to eligible voters
“not earlier than the thirtieth day nor later than the seventh day before the
election”).
503. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3001 (requiring application for absentee ballot
be submitted “between the 29th and 7th day prior to the election”).
504. See Michael T. Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in the Wake of
Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks, 67 EMORY L.J. 545 (2018).
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federal legislators not only to specify the date of federal
elections, but also to specify the manner of holding federal
elections.505 Thus, regarding a new election date, Congress could
legislate a safe harbor for votes that would have been valid when
cast in connection with the original election date.
2.

Analyzing Entrenching Legislation

When addressing entrenching legislation in voting rights
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis somewhat resembles
the analysis employed by Delaware courts when addressing
directors undertaking entrenching action. Though the U.S.
Supreme Court considers the right to vote to be a fundamental
right,506 and though the Court, in earlier decisions, applied strict
scrutiny to infringement of that right,507 the Court’s analysis
generally has become less demanding.508 Only if legislation
subjects voting rights to “severe” restrictions must that
legislation be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling
governmental interest; legislation that imposes “reasonable,
nondiscriminatory” restrictions on voting rights generally will
be upheld as furthering governmental regulatory interests. 509
Recall the analysis of Delaware courts: if the action by
incumbent directors had a primary purpose of impeding an
effective vote by shareholders, then the incumbent directors

505. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The times, places and manner of
holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make
or alter such regulations . . . .”).
506. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
184 (1979) (emphasizing that “voting is of the most fundamental significance
under our constitutional structure”); Williams, 393 U.S. at 30 (emphasizing
that the right to vote “rank[s] among our most precious freedoms”); Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (describing the right to vote as a
“fundamental political right”).
507. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184–85 (requiring that state
legislation further a “compelling interest” by “least drastic means”).
508. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432–34 (1992) (“[T]o subject
every voting regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of States
seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”).
509. Id. at 434; see Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
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must establish compelling justification for their action.510 The
U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis embraces components of that
corporate law analysis. First, those courts do not simply protect
the hollow act of voting. Instead, the electorate must enjoy an
“effective” right to vote.511 For example, neither shareholders
nor citizens would enjoy “effective” voting rights if their votes
were diluted or if dissidents were precluded from the ballot.512
Second, those courts acknowledge that rules are necessary to
ensure fair elections free of fraud and to avoid an endless array
of frivolous candidates.513 Consequently, those courts are
prepared to give credence to such rules without subjecting them
to heightened scrutiny.514 For example, because incumbents and
voters should have an opportunity to learn about dissident
candidates, rules that require advance notice of their candidacy
are enforceable.515 Incumbent directors and legislators are given
leeway to regulate elections.516 Third, however, as voting
510. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130 (Del. 2003);
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660–61 (Del. Ch. 1988).
511. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (discussing “the right
of qualified voters . . . to cast their votes effectively”); Ill. State Bd. of Elections,
440 U.S. at 184 (same); Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 787 (“vote[] effectively”);
Blasius Indus., Inc., 564 A.2d at 660–61 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“[C]orporate acts
intended primarily to thwart effective exercise of the [shareholders’]
franchise . . . [will be invalidated absent] . . . compelling justification.”).
512. See supra Part 0.
513. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair
and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the
democratic processes.”); Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Cap. Partners
Master Fund I, Ltd., 924 A.2d 228, 239 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that advance
notice bylaws “permit orderly meetings and election contests and . . . provide
fair warning [that allows] sufficient time to respond”).
514. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432 (“Petitioner proceeds from the erroneous
assumption that a law that imposes any burden upon the right to vote must
be subject to strict scrutiny. Our cases do not so hold.”); id. at 433 (“[T]o subject
every voting regulation to strict scrutiny . . . as petitioner suggests, would tie
the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and
efficiently.”); MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 1130 (noting that heightened scrutiny is
“rarely” applied).
515. See supra notes 485–486 and accompanying text.
516. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (“It is very unlikely that all or even a large
portion of the state election laws would fail to pass muster under our cases.”);
Openwave Sys. Inc., 924 A.2d at 239 (upholding advance notice bylaw).
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restrictions become more severe, those courts require
rule-makers to establish “compelling” justification for those
restrictions.517 The U.S. Supreme Court’s test expressly
references the concept of narrow tailoring, and, in practice, the
Delaware courts impose a similar requirement, even though the
Delaware Supreme Court’s test does not expressly reference
narrow tailoring.518 Fourth, those courts focus upon the purpose
and effect of legislation, not the legislators’ motivations.519
Legislators’ motivations, though not the focus, may inform a
court’s inquiry into purpose. 520 The corporate law inquiry into
“primary purpose” is consistent with the proposals of election
law scholars.521
517. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (requiring that “severe” restrictions be
narrowly drawn to advance the governmental interest of “compelling”
importance); MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 1129 (“compelling justification”).
518. See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992) (requiring that severe
restrictions must be “narrowly drawn to advance a [governmental] interest of
compelling importance”); Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 810
(Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that the challenged action must be “reasonably
necessary to advance a compelling . . . interest”).
519. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 24 (invalidating legislation because it was
“virtually impossible” for dissidents to appear on the ballot, without inquiring
into legislators’ intent); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It
is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down
an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive.”); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2516 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“[B]y requiring plaintiffs to make difficult showings relating to
both purpose and effects, the standard invalidates the most extreme, but only
the most extreme, partisan gerrymanders.”); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp Inc., 579
A.2d 1115, 1121–22 (Del. Ch. 1990) (“[I]nequitable conduct does not
necessarily require an evil or selfish motive.”).
520. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2517 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“But when
political actors have a specific and predominant intent to entrench themselves
in power by manipulating district lines, that goes too far.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267, 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen partisanship is the
legislature’s sole motivation—when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken
unabashedly . . . the governing body cannot be said to have acted
impartially.”); id. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I would, however, treat any
showing of intent in a major-party case as too equivocal to count unless the
entire legislature were controlled by the governor’s party (or the dominant
legislative party were vetoproof).”).
521. Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 175 (2008) (proposing analysis that requires
consideration of the “predominant effect of directly burdening individual
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VI. Extending the Corporate Inquiry to the Legislative Setting
In the corporate setting, when incumbent directors act with
a primary purpose of impeding the shareholders’ franchise, then
the incumbent directors must establish compelling justification
for their action.522 Courts have applied the inquiry to situations
in which incumbent directors strategically shifted the date of an
election.523 What if a court extended the inquiry from corporate
law to the legislative setting when incumbent legislators
strategically altered the date of an election? Part IV.A applies
the inquiry to a few basic scenarios. Part IV.B briefly sketches
out related issues that merit deeper consideration than space
allows.
A.

Three Scenarios

This Part sets forth three basic scenarios. In the corporate
setting, the demands of fiduciary duties vary with the context,
requiring courts to make detailed factual findings, which, if
varied slightly, could significantly impact any conclusion.524
Slightly varying the facts of the basic scenarios below could
easily vary the outcome.
As mentioned at the beginning of this Article, incumbent
politicians in the House and in the Senate have proposed many
bills over the years that would shift federal elections from
Tuesday in early November to a weekend (Saturday and
Sunday) in early November.525 Each of those bills was proposed
by a Democrat, so there may be a partisan advantage
voters”); Hasen, supra note 347, at 846 (“[C]ourts should primarily examine
the effect of election laws on the rights of individuals . . . .”); id. at 846 (“[P]roof
of . . . bad [legislative] intent should be neither necessary nor sufficient for an
election law challenge to succeed, though it should be relevant in getting
courts to take a hard look at election laws.”); Pildes, supra note 22, at 76
(“[L]aws whose sole or predominant purpose is political self-entrenchment, of
incumbents or parties, should be unconstitutional in principle.”).
522. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1118 (Del. 2003).
523. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. 1971).
524. See supra notes 446–452 and accompanying text (emphasizing factual
distinctions between Aprahamian, in which the court enjoined the board’s
action, and Gintel, in which the court upheld the board’s action).
525. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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motivating this proposed shift. 526 Most people do not work on
the weekend; most people, however, work on Tuesday. Even
though most states require employers to allow employees time
away from the jobsite to vote, many states do not impose this
requirement on employers.527 For that reason, among other
reasons, many eligible voters do not vote in federal elections.528
So legislators may attempt to increase voter participation,
which is generally accepted as a positive goal.529 Assume that
such a bill was enacted shortly after a federal election, so that
its practical impact was almost two years away. Increasing
voter turnout appears to be the primary purpose of shifting
federal elections from Tuesday to the weekend. 530 It may be that
(1) increased voter turnout favors Democrats, or (2) the primary
purpose of the legislation is not realized, because people may
favor leisure on the weekend over voting, and because people
may have been willing to vote on Tuesday to take time away
from their jobs, but those two considerations are largely beside
the point. So long as the primary purpose was not to impede
effective voting, a court would not apply heightened scrutiny.531
Moreover, the court would not focus on the primary purpose of
the legislation without considering its actual effect, 532 and its
526. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
527. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14000 (West 2020); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-110
(McKinney 2020); Jacey Fortin, Why Only Some Workers Get Time Off to Vote
on Election Day, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/T55D-VLKL.
528. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES tbl.9 at 12 (2012) (indicating approximate voting-age population of 235
million in 2010), with FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012 (July
2013) (indicating total votes of approximately 129 million in the presidential
election of 2012).
529. Arian Campo-Flores, Kentucky’s New Governor Restores Voting
Rights to Nonviolent Felons, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc
/3447-EDYM (last updated Dec. 12, 2019, 4:03 PM) (“We have a moral
responsibility to protect and extend the right to vote . . . .” (quoting Ky. Gov.
Andy Beshear)).
530. See Fortin, supra note 527.
531. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 428 (1992) (“Where the burden
on voters’ rights is slight, the state need not establish a compelling interest to
tip the constitutional scales in its direction.”).
532. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974) (“We must, therefore,
inquire as to the nature, extent, and likely impact of the California
requirements.”).
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actual effect seemingly would not impede citizens’ ability to vote
effectively, as citizens had ample notice of, and time to adjust
to, the new election date.
While the first example involved a shift well in advance of
any election, the next two examples involve last-minute shifts
in the date of the election. Assume that, as a federal election
drew near, U.S. intelligence agencies discovered evidence that
foreign nationals violated our campaign laws and corrupted our
states’ election machinery.533 Those developments led Congress
to amend the U.S. Code to delay the election to allow the impact
of the illegal messaging to dissipate and to allow debugging of
election machinery. Congress feared that proceeding with the
election as originally scheduled would have produced results not
reflective of the electorate’s true intentions, perhaps impacted
by illegal campaigning. Here, it seems that the primary purpose
of the legislation was to disenfranchise the electorate in early
November by displacing the majority’s will at that time. Given
that primary purpose, a court would review the challenged
legislation under heightened scrutiny.534 Nonetheless, on these
bare facts, the court likely would conclude that the government
had a compelling interest in ensuring that the election was not
tainted by fraud.535 Limited court relief might be appropriate,
as infringements on the right to vote must be tailored to the
extent necessary.536 A delayed election may not be necessary in
some states if those states’ election machinery had not been

533. See Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018) https://perma.cc/6TEG-4U3B (discussing the 2016
Russian attacks on the United States’ presidential election); see generally
Morley, supra note 504 (addressing election delays in the case of emergencies).
534. See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992) (applying strict
scrutiny to legislation that “severely” restricts voting rights). Of course, a court
might conclude that a nondiscriminatory, broadly applicable law that briefly
delayed an election did not “severely” restrict voting rights, but simply
inconvenienced voters. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553
U.S. 181, 205–06 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
535. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair
and honest . . . .”); Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 (plurality) (acknowledging
governmental interest in “protecting the integrity and reliability of the
electoral process”).
536. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.

Cleveland.Final .docx (Do Not Delete)

POLITICIANS AS FIDUCIARIES

1/15/2021 4:45 PM

1553

hacked and their citizens had not been subjected to illegal
campaigning.
The third scenario also involves a last-minute delay in the
date of the election, where the incumbents’ defeat was imminent
and where they collectively and boldly asserted partisan reasons
for “rigging” the election to ensure their re-election.537 The
primary purpose of the legislation would trigger heightened
scrutiny and, on these bare facts, the incumbents have offered
no compelling justification for the delayed election.
B.

Other Considerations

1.

Private Enforcement

Some scholars generally would oppose private enforcement
of duties imposed on federal legislators because the U.S.
Constitution expressly empowers other actors to police straying
legislators.538 When legislators breach their duties, the
Constitution expressly contemplates policing by the co-equal
branches, by colleagues through impeachment, and by voters at
the polls.539 However, the President, if aligned with the
incumbents who enacted entrenching legislation, would refuse
to police any such breach by refusing to veto the legislation.
Impeachment is a non-starter, given that the challenged
legislation passed both chambers with majority support. And,
537. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t is unfortunate that our legislators have reached the point of
declaring that, when it comes to apportionment: ‘We are in the business of
rigging elections.’” (quoting John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away
from Easy Election, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1)).
538. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1174 (describing the Framers’ views on
impeachment); Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 554–55
Fiduciary
accountability
under
governance-type
mandates . . . do[es] not imply a correlative claim right that is
enjoyed and may be asserted by a right holder in her personal
capacity . . . . [T]he undefined and contingent nature of individuals’
beneficial interests in governance mandates makes it impossible to
recognize individuated claims rights in them.
539. Davis, supra note 80, at 1174 (“Impeachment . . . was the principal
punitive measure associated in the public mind with an official’s breach of
trust.”); id at 1175 (“[T]he ballot box provides an additional remedy for a
legislator’s derogation of political duties.”).
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the premise is that legislators ensured their re-election,
emasculating discipline by voters. That leaves the judiciary as
the source of any potential relief.540 And someone must appeal
to the judiciary. Given that the challenged legislation infringes
on a citizen’s right to vote at a regularly scheduled election, a
citizen should be able to seek relief.541 In Rucho, a citizen’s right
to vote was impaired by dilution, yet the Court concluded that
the claim was non-justiciable; however, the Court emphasized
that the states were able to act, and some states had already
acted, to remedy the citizen’s concerns.542 In contrast to Rucho,
the states would be preempted by federal legislation that altered
the date of a federal election.543
2.

Judicial Relief

Assuming the existence of such duties, some scholars would
generally oppose judicial enforcement of the fiduciary duties of

540. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2523 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“[P]oliticians’ incentives conflict with voters’ interests, leaving
citizens without any political remedy for their constitutional harms.” (quoting
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1941 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring)));
Issacharoff,
supra
note
231,
at
165
(“[C]onstitutional
courts . . . typically . . . overs[ee] . . . the electoral process itself, reaching in
many cases to election administration . . . and electoral challenges.”).
541. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 375 (1963) (“[A]ny person whose
right to vote is impaired, has standing to sue.” (citations omitted)); United
States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 227 (1918) (“The right to vote is
personal . . . .”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (same) (quoting
Bathgate, 246 U.S. at 227).
542. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08 (majority opinion).
543. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”); id. art. VI (“[T]he laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .”).
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federal legislators.544 Though similar in certain respects,545 the
Rucho Court’s non-justiciable conclusion is distinguishable with
respect to crafting a remedy.546 Regarding Rucho’s partisan
gerrymandering, the state legislature periodically must re-draw
federal districts, given the Malapportionment Cases,547 and the
federal courts are ill-equipped to draw those districts.548 If,
however, federal legislators violated the Constitution by
altering the date of a federal election, a court would not be
required to identify a new date for the election;549 the court could
simply bar the effect of the legislation that otherwise would

544. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1171–78 (“To the extent that the
Founders thought of judicial review of legislative action in private law terms,
there is strong evidence they would have looked to the corporate law doctrine
of repugnancy rather than to private fiduciaries’ duties of loyalty and care.”);
Gerken & Kang, supra note 80, at 89. (“There is a world outside the
judiciary . . . .”). But see FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 256 (“Doctrinally, equity
is the source of the remedies for violations of fiduciary obligations, because
fiduciary obligations originated in the English equity courts.”); Morley, supra
note 504, at 586–95 (addressing judicial review).
545. Just as the judiciary may lack competence to determine whether
politics played too great of a role when state legislators drew a federal district,
so too may the judiciary lack competence to determine whether politics played
too great of a role when the federal legislature shifted the date of a federal
election. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2549 (“[F]ederal courts are not equipped to
apportion political power as a matter of fairness, nor is there any basis for
concluding that they were authorized to do so.”).
546. See id. (“The question here is whether there is an ‘appropriate role for
the Federal Judiciary’ in remedying the problem of partisan
gerrymandering—whether such claims are claims of legal right, resolvable
according to legal principles, or political questions that must find their
resolution elsewhere.” (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1920 (2018))).
547. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 375 (1963).
548. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2549 (“[F]ederal courts are not equipped to
apportion political power as a matter of fairness, nor is there any basis for
concluding that they were authorized to do so.”).
549. Cf. Ocilla Indus., Inc. v. Katz, 677 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (“[C]onfusion . . . could ensue if another date were arbitrarily selected
by the court . . . .”).
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have shifted the date of a federal election.550 Elegantly crafted
relief would not be necessary.551
VII. Conclusion
Notwithstanding
federal
legislators’
constitutional
authority to shift the date of a federal election, courts should
review any such shift with skepticism. Delaware courts have
long viewed with skepticism any action by corporate directors to
alter the date of a vote by shareholders.552 A rich body of
corporate law—which reflects entrenchment concerns
previously articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
legislative setting—provides a helpful analog.553 The analog is
consistent with a growing body of scholarship that recognizes
federal legislators as fiduciaries, like corporate directors, and

550. See MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 93
(Farrand ed., 1966) (“A law violating a constitution established by the people
themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void.”); FRANKEL,
supra note 73, at 245 (“[W]hen the fiduciaries’ actions are devious and
self-interested the courts will interfere.”); id. at 249 (discussing injunctions as
relief for breach of fiduciary duties); Amar, supra note 74, at 1434 (analogizing
government officials to corporate officers and concluding that any limits
imposed by the charter could be enforced by courts); Pildes, supra note 22, at
84 (“[C]ourts are . . . better at vetoing exercises of governmental power than
at mobilizing power affirmatively.”). The reach of any such injunction could be
a contentious issue. See Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal”
Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 993–1008 (2020)). A claim for damages
would fail. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA
Classics ed., 2009) (“[T]he members of [the Senate] should be exempt from
punishment for acts done in a collective capacity . . . .”); Davis, supra note 80,
at 1201–03 (rejecting remedies for breach of fiduciary duty, but mentioning
disgorgement, restitution, punitive damages, and removal from office, not
injunctions).
551. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 354 (2004) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“To devise a judicial remedy . . . it is not necessary to . . . [furnish]
a precise measure of harm caused by divergence from the ideal in each case.”);
id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts should be able to
identify . . . unjustified entrenching in power of a political party that the
voters have rejected . . . . And they should be able to design a remedy for
extreme cases.”).
552. See supra Part 0.
553. See supra Part 0.
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